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ABSTRACT 
 
MARKET FEEDBACK AND VALUATION JUDGMENT: REVISITED 
BY 
Julia Freybote 
April 16, 2012 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Paul G. Gallimore 
Major Academic Unit: Department of Real Estate 
 
Appraisers receive feedback from a variety of sources such as other appraisers, clients 
and the real estate market. Previous studies find client feedback to introduce an upward 
bias into commercial and residential appraisal judgments. Hansz and Diaz (2001) find 
that the provision of transaction price (market) feedback for a previously valued property 
biases commercial appraisers upwardly in subsequent valuations. The authors provide 
market optimism, client feedback and a reduced conservatism bias as explanations for 
their findings. However, previous client and market feedback studies were conducted in 
upward-trending or booming real estate markets. The identified upward bias in valuation 
judgments may have been the result of positive real estate market conditions.  
 
This study investigates the impact of transaction price feedback on residential appraisal 
judgment in a changed appraisal task environment, characterized by a depressed housing 
market, market pessimism, conservative lenders and a changed residential appraisal 
industry. As Hansz and Diaz (2001) find an upward appraisal bias in an upward-trending 
market, I expect market feedback to introduce a downward bias into residential appraisal 
judgments in a depressed market. Compared to a “no feedback” control group, residential 
appraisers receiving the feedback that their previous value estimates were too high, 
compared to the realized transaction price, are expected to make significantly lower 
subsequent value judgments for an unrelated property. The “too low” feedback is not 
expected to have an impact on subsequent value judgments. 
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I test the hypotheses with a controlled experiment using a pre-posttest design. The 
experimental design has one factor (transaction price feedback) fixed at three different 
levels (“too low”, “too high”, “no feedback”). A posttest-only validity control group is 
added to test for a potential testing bias in the pre-posttest design. This study uses 
residential expert appraisers, defined as active Oregon State certified residential 
appraisers, from the Portland metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as subjects. 
Experimental subjects are randomly selected from a list of all certified residential 
appraisers in the Portland MSA.  Experimental subjects are randomly assigned to the 
control and treatment groups (10 subjects per group; N=40).  
 
Subjects in the treatment groups and pre-posttest “no feedback” control group are asked 
to value a lot of vacant residential land in the geographically unfamiliar Roswell, 
Georgia. After they provide their value estimates for this first valuation case, subjects in 
the treatment groups are given a note from a seller’s broker stating the transaction price 
for the previously valued property. Subjects in the “too high” feedback group receive a 
transaction price that is 15% below their estimates and subjects in the “too low” feedback 
group receive a transaction price that is 15% above their value estimates. The control 
group receives no feedback. All treatment and control groups are then given a second 
(unrelated) valuation case of vacant residential land in Newnan, Georgia and asked for 
their value estimate. The experiment is concluded with an exit questionnaire containing 
demographic and professional questions as well as manipulation checks. 
  
The experimental data are analyzed using the parametric independent samples t-test. The 
assumptions of normality and equal variances are not violated by the dataset. A one-way 
ANOVA and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test are used as robustness checks. All 
statistical tests conclude that neither the mean of the “too high” feedback group nor the 
mean of the “too low” feedback group are statistically different at the 5% level from the 
mean of the “no feedback” control group. Thus, no evidence is found that transaction 
price feedback biases residential appraisal judgments in a depressed market.  
 
 
   IX 
The insignificant results are further analyzed to assess whether they are due to a non-
reception of the treatment by subjects, low statistical power or a non-existing 
relationship: The explanation that subjects did not read the treatment note can be 
excluded. A power analysis reveals low statistical power and very small effect sizes for 
both treatments. An alternative explanation for the insignificant results is the absence of 
the hypothesized relationship. The main client group of experimental subjects is appraisal 
management companies, which due to legislation passed after 2007, work with appraisers 
on behalf of lenders. As a consequence, residential appraisers do not receive direct client 
feedback anymore (compared to Hansz and Diaz, 2001) and may not respond 
subconsciously to the “too high” feedback.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   I 
Table of Content 
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................III 
List of Figures.................................................................................................................. IV 
List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... V 
1  Introduction................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1  Background............................................................................................................ 1 
1.2  Objectives of dissertation....................................................................................... 4 
1.3  Limitations of the study ......................................................................................... 6 
1.4  Contribution of dissertation ................................................................................... 7 
1.5  Organization........................................................................................................... 8 
2  Literature review ........................................................................................................ 9 
2.1  Behavioral studies in real estate valuation judgment............................................. 9 
2.1.1  The behavior of appraisers.............................................................................. 9 
2.1.2  Anchoring studies ......................................................................................... 10 
2.1.3  Feedback studies ........................................................................................... 14 
2.1.3.1  Client feedback ...................................................................................... 14 
2.1.3.2  Market feedback..................................................................................... 15 
2.1.3.3  Outcome feedback as market feedback.................................................. 16 
2.2  Changes to the appraisal task environment and industry..................................... 19 
3  Data and Methodology ............................................................................................. 24 
3.1  Hypotheses........................................................................................................... 24 
3.2  Experimental design ............................................................................................ 25 
3.3  Internal validity and causality.............................................................................. 27 
3.3.1  Treatment ...................................................................................................... 28 
3.3.2  Manipulation checks ..................................................................................... 29 
3.3.3  Threats to internal validity ............................................................................ 31 
3.4  External validity and sample selection ................................................................ 32 
3.4.1  Sampling frame and sample size................................................................... 32 
3.4.2  Participant selection and acquisition............................................................. 33 
   II 
3.5  Construct validity and operationalization ............................................................ 35 
3.5.1  Measurement instrument............................................................................... 35 
3.5.2  Pilot study ..................................................................................................... 37 
3.5.3  Threats to construct validity.......................................................................... 39 
3.6  Conclusion validity and statistical analysis ......................................................... 40 
3.6.1  Diagnostics and assumption testing .............................................................. 40 
3.6.2  Hypothesis testing using independent samples t-test.................................... 41 
3.6.3  Threats to conclusion validity ....................................................................... 42 
3.6.4  Non-parametric robustness checks ............................................................... 44 
4  Results ........................................................................................................................ 45 
4.1  Experimental subject profile................................................................................ 45 
4.2  Descriptive statistics and diagnostics .................................................................. 49 
4.3  Hypothesis testing results .................................................................................... 53 
4.4  Robustness checks ............................................................................................... 56 
4.4.1.1  ANOVA ................................................................................................. 56 
4.4.1.2  Non-parametric test................................................................................ 56 
4.4.1.3  Manipulation checks .............................................................................. 57 
4.4.1.4  Power analysis ....................................................................................... 60 
5  Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 62 
5.1  Discussion............................................................................................................ 62 
5.2  Future research..................................................................................................... 65 
References........................................................................................................................ 68 
Figures.............................................................................................................................. 76 
Appendix A: Valuation Case 1 ...................................................................................... 80 
Appendix B: Valuation Case 2....................................................................................... 96 
Appendix C: Exit Questionnaire ................................................................................. 112 
         
 
 
 
 
 
   III 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Testable Hypotheses ........................................................................................ 25 
Table 2: Testable Hypotheses (Robustness Check) ..................................................... 25 
Table 3: Experimental Design........................................................................................ 26 
Table 4: Overview of Subject Property and Comparable Sales ................................. 38 
Table 5: Full Sample Profile .......................................................................................... 46 
Table 6: Experimental Group Profiles.......................................................................... 47 
Table 7: Appraisal Client Profile................................................................................... 49 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics (Valuation Case 1) ....................................................... 49 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics (Valuation Case 2) ....................................................... 49 
Table 10: Moments of Distribution (Valuation Case 2) .............................................. 50 
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics (DIFFVAL) ................................................................ 51 
Table 12: Moments of Distribution (DIFFVAL).......................................................... 51 
Table 13: Quantitative Diagnostic Tests ....................................................................... 52 
Table 14: Result of Hypothesis Testing......................................................................... 56 
Table 15: Result of Hypothesis Testing (Robustness Checks) .................................... 56 
Table 16: Effect Sizes...................................................................................................... 58 
Table 17: Manipulation Checks..................................................................................... 59 
Table 18: Results Power Analysis.................................................................................. 61 
 
 
 
 
   IV 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Histogram Valuation Case 2 (Full Sample) ................................................. 76 
Figure 2: Q-Q Plots Valuation Case 2 (Full Sample)................................................... 77 
Figure 3: Histogram (DIFFVAL) .................................................................................. 78 
Figure 4: Q-Q Plots (DIFFVAL) ................................................................................... 79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   V 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AD – Anderson-Darling 
AMC - Appraisal Management Company 
ANOVA – Analysis of Variance 
AQB - Appraiser Qualifications Board 
BPO – Broker Price Opinion 
CLT – Central Limit Theorem 
Comp(s) – Comparable Sale(s) 
DIFFVAL – difference between the estimate for the first and second valuation case 
FHA - Federal Housing Administration 
HVCC – Home Valuation Code of Conduct 
FDIC – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
IFA - Independent Fee Appraiser 
IRB – Institutional Review Board 
JB – Jarque-Bera 
KS - Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
MLS – Multiple Listing Service 
MSA – Metropolitan Statistical Area 
NAIFA – National Association of Independent Fee Appraisers 
OACLB - Oregon Appraiser Certification and Licensure Board 
SRA – Senior Residential Appraiser 
SW – Shapiro-Wilk  
VA – Veterans Affairs 
   1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The main objective of residential and commercial real estate appraisal is to determine the 
true market value of a property. In order to make an unbiased and objective value 
judgment, appraisers have to analyze and interpret real estate market conditions. 
However, compared to other market participants such as brokers and investors, appraisers 
are not involved in current transactions and, due to their reliance on past transaction data, 
are at an informational disadvantage regarding current market conditions. Given the 
characteristics of real estate markets such as segmentation, infrequent transactions and 
proprietary information, real estate market feedback is valuable to appraisers. It provides 
appraisers with information about current market conditions and the accuracy of previous 
valuation judgments. Normative expectations predict an unbiased and symmetric 
influence of market feedback on valuation judgments. However, Hansz and Diaz (2001) 
based on the 1999 dissertation of Hansz, find that market feedback asymmetrically biases 
valuation judgments. Commercial appraisers, who received the feedback that their 
previous value judgment was too low compared to the realized sales price, made 
significantly higher subsequent value judgments for an unrelated property in a different 
geographical market. This relationship does not hold for the “too high” market feedback. 
Thus, market feedback can lead to non-normative behavior of appraisers. The authors 
discuss a number of potential explanations for this upward bias: Firstly, commercial 
appraisers may be used to clients who frequently request upward adjustments and thus 
automatically adjust upwardly if provided with “too low” feedback. Secondly, appraisers 
may be optimistic about the real estate market. Lastly, appraisers may have a 
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conservatism bias, which results in more cautious value estimates. Market feedback 
reduces this conservatism bias. In conclusion, the findings of Hansz and Diaz (2001) 
suggest that market feedback provided in rising real estate market conditions induces the 
upward bias in valuation judgments.  
The collapse of the housing bubble in 2007 and the subsequent financial and economic 
crisis have resulted in significant changes to the appraisal task environment, particularly 
for residential appraisers. The most severe change is a depressed housing market 
characterized by negative equity, few transactions, short-sales and foreclosures. The 
conditions of the depressed market differ significantly from the market conditions at the 
time Hansz and Diaz (2001) conducted their experiments. Compared to a rising market, 
lenders in a depressed market are likely to be more conservative and risk-averse in 
underwriting practices and equity contribution requirements. As a consequence, lenders 
and other clients are likely to prefer value estimates at the lower end of the justifiable 
range in order to reduce their risk exposure. The pessimistic market sentiment 
characteristic of downward-trending real estate markets also affects appraisers.  
In addition to the deteriorated real estate market conditions, the appraisal industry has 
undergone a number of changes since 2007. These changes predominantly affect 
residential appraisers and include new legislation, litigations and structural changes to the 
appraisal industry. Legislation such as the Home Valuation Code of Conduct (HVCC) 
disconnects residential appraisers and residential mortgage lenders by placing appraisal 
management companies (AMC) between them to eliminate client pressure on appraisers. 
Residential appraisers have also become subject to litigation, for example, by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp (FDIC), which is suing appraisers for valuation judgments made 
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at the height of the residential real estate market boom. Structural changes affecting 
residential appraisers include an increased importance of AMCs, reduced fees and a more 
frequent use of the broker’s price opinion (BPO) by appraisal clients.  
The changed task environment of residential appraisers, characterized by a depressed 
housing market, a pessimistic sentiment and conservative clients, represents a good 
starting point to revisit the findings of Hansz and Diaz (2001) and extend their study to 
residential appraisers. Two previous studies have shown that client feedback biases 
commercial (Hansz, 2004a) and residential appraisers (Diaz and Hansz, 2010) upwardly. 
Both studies were conducted in rising commercial and residential markets (2002-2004). 
These findings suggest that, although commercial and residential real estate differ and 
commercial valuations tend to be more complex, both types of appraisers behave 
similarly when exposed to client feedback. My study focuses on market feedback, which 
implicitly includes client feedback as discussed by Hansz and Diaz (2001). It tests 
whether residential appraisers, analogously to commercial appraisers, respond 
asymmetrically to market feedback. If the upward bias in value judgments found by 
Hansz and Diaz (2001) is the result of upward-trending market conditions, I expect a 
downward bias in a depressed market.  
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1.2 Objectives of dissertation 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of market feedback on residential 
real estate valuation judgment in a depressed market. In particular, I investigate whether 
market feedback provided in a depressed housing market introduces a downward bias 
into the subsequent valuation of an unrelated property. Following Hansz and Diaz (2001), 
I define market feedback as simple outcome feedback in form of the transaction price of a 
previously valued property. 
In my analysis, I test the following hypotheses: 
H1: In a depressed market, market feedback in form of the realized transaction price of a 
previously valued residential property asymmetrically biases the subsequent 
valuation judgment for an unrelated property.  
H1a: Compared to a control group receiving no feedback, residential expert 
appraisers receiving the feedback that their previous value estimates 
were “too low” with regard to the realized transaction price don’t make 
higher subsequent value judgments on an unrelated property.  
H1b: Compared to a control group receiving no feedback, residential expert 
appraisers receiving the feedback that their previous value estimates 
were “too high” with regard to the realized transaction price make 
lower subsequent value judgments on an unrelated property.  
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I test my research hypotheses in a pre-posttest experiment with one factor (“transaction 
price feedback”) fixed at three levels: “too low” feedback, “too high” feedback and “no 
feedback” control group. Analogously to Hansz and Diaz (2001), I also use a posttest-
only validity control group to test for a potential testing bias. My experimental subjects 
are 40 residential expert appraisers defined as Oregon State certified residential 
appraisers in the Portland MSA. Subjects are randomly selected and randomly assigned 
to the treatment and control groups.  
A pre-posttest experiment is used to test the hypotheses. It consists of two phases: In the 
first phase subjects of all groups, except the validity control group, are asked to value a 
plot of vacant residential land in a geographically unfamiliar location (Georgia). After 
completion of the first valuation case, subjects in the treatment groups are administered 
their treatment. The transaction price feedback treatment is in form of a handwritten note 
by the seller’s broker of the previously valued property (valuation case 1). The 
transaction price shown in the note either exceeds the previous valuation by 15% (“too 
low”-level) or is below the previous valuation by 15% (“too high”-level). In the second 
phase of the experiment, subjects of the treatment and control groups, including the 
validity control group, are required to value an unrelated plot of vacant residential land, 
located in a different county in Georgia than the previous property. To determine the 
differences between experimental groups, a variety of statistical methods are used, such 
as the independent samples parametric t-test, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U-test. 
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1.3 Limitations of the study 
Hansz and Diaz (2001) present three explanations for the identified upward bias in 
subsequent value judgments: (1) client behavior/feedback,  (2) market sentiment or mood 
and (3) conservatism bias. A detailed analysis of any of these three hypotheses is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. The experimental design of this study doesn’t explicitly 
include any client-agent effects that would reflect client feedback. Additionally, no mood 
affecting manipulations (e.g. to introduce market pessimism) or conservatism bias-related 
manipulations are made. However, the implicit manipulation in my experiment is “real 
estate market conditions”: As shown by Hansz and Diaz (2001), the mindset of 
experimental subjects is affected by current real estate market conditions. Daily work 
experiences of subjects, such as a pessimistic market sentiment and client expectations, 
introduce depressed market conditions into the experiment. 
This study does not account for decision tools such as CoStar as used in Tidwell (2011). 
The author uses technology to test whether it mitigates the effect of the anchoring and 
adjustment bias on valuation judgments. My study does not include any decision tools for 
the following reasons: Firstly, the findings of Tidwell (2011) indicate no difference 
between value judgments of CoStar and non-CoStar using groups, suggesting no 
significant impact of decision tools on appraisal decision-making. Secondly, compared to 
the anchoring study of Tidwell (2011) focusing on commercial appraisers, the 
investigation in hand focuses on market feedback and residential appraisers, who don’t 
use CoStar. Thirdly, while information provided by tools such as CoStar for commercial 
appraisers or Multiple Listing Service (MLS) databases for residential appraisers 
represents market feedback (e.g. transaction prices and market reports), the wealth and 
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presentation of information provided does not allow to experimentally test the distinct 
impact of a particular type of feedback (e.g. simple outcome feedback). Such technology-
based information tools for appraisers may also introduce confounding effects.  
1.4 Contribution of dissertation 
This study contributes to the existing behavioral literature on real estate valuation in the 
following ways: Compared to studies focusing on the anchoring and adjustment bias and 
valuation judgments (e.g. Tidwell, 2011; Cypher and Hansz, 2003; Diaz and Hansz, 
2001; Hansz, 2004b; Diaz and Wolverton, 1998; Diaz and Hansz, 1997; Diaz, 1997; 
Wolverton, 1996; Gallimore, 1994), few studies investigate the impact of feedback on 
appraisal behavior (e.g. Diaz and Hansz, 2010; Levy and Schuck, 2005, 1999; Hansz, 
2004a; Wolverton and Gallimore, 1999; Kinnard, Lenk and Worzala, 1997). Feedback 
studies, with the exception of Hansz and Diaz (2001) and Hansz (1999), on the other 
hand predominantly focus on the impact of client feedback on valuation judgment. The 
study in hand thus adds to the scarce literature on market feedback and appraisal 
behavior. 
The majority of experiments in the behavioral real estate valuation literature were 
conducted in an upward-trending or booming real estate market environment. (e.g. Hansz 
and Diaz, 2001; Diaz and Hansz, 2001) These real estate market conditions may have had 
an effect on the outcome of previous experiments. This study is the first to investigate the 
relationship of feedback and valuation judgment in a depressed real estate market. The 
current residential real estate market crisis represents an ideal background and timing for 
such an investigation, making this study highly relevant.  
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Additionally, residential real estate appraisers have received considerably less attention 
than commercial appraisers in the behavioral real estate literature. While some studies 
investigate the behavior of residential appraisers (e.g. Diaz, Gallimore and Levy, 2004, 
2002; Gallimore and Wolverton, 1997; Diaz, 1990), only three studies, Diaz and Hansz 
(2010) as well as Gallimore and Wolverton (2000) and Wolverton and Gallimore (1999) 
to some extent, investigate the impact of feedback on residential valuation judgments. All 
three studies, however, focus on client feedback. The study in hand is the first market 
feedback study in residential appraisal.  
 
1.5 Organization 
Following the introductory Chapter 1, Chapter 2 presents a literature review of behavioral 
real estate studies with a focus on studies investigating the impact of feedback on value 
judgments. Chapter 3 presents the hypotheses and experimental design (data and 
methodology). It is followed by the results in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents a conclusion.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following chapter presents a literature review. It spans psychology, accounting, 
forecasting and behavioral real estate. The first part reviews the existing behavioral 
literature in real estate valuation, particularly the impact of feedback on valuation 
judgment. The second part discusses changes to the residential appraisal task 
environment.  
2.1 Behavioral studies in real estate valuation judgment 
2.1.1 The behavior of appraisers 
Real estate valuation has received the most attention in the behavioral real estate 
literature. The objective of real estate appraisals is the unbiased, independent and 
objective assessment of the true property market value. A normative appraisal process 
has been formulated to ensure the unbiasedness and objectiveness of value judgments. 
The normative valuation model is based on human information processing as discussed 
by Simon (1978) and Simon and Newell (1972). It forms part of appraisal training in the 
US and prescribes a series of steps to be taken in solving valuation problems. (For a 
depiction of the normative valuation process, see Diaz, 1990; Diaz, Gallimore and Levy, 
2002) However, actual behavior of expert appraisers differs from the prescribed 
normative model. While novice appraisers with limited experience adhere to the 
normative process to solve valuation problems, the problem-solving behavior of expert 
appraisers is more efficient and based on production rules developed with increasing 
experience. These efficient production rules are applied automatically to routine 
problems resulting in eliminations or alterations of prescribed steps and consequently a 
deviation from the normative valuation process. (Diaz, 1990) In experiments, Diaz (1990) 
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finds that expert appraisers deviate from the normative process when valuing a residential 
property in familiar as well as unfamiliar geographical areas. In an international 
extension to Diaz (1990), Diaz, Gallimore and Levy (2004, 2002) suggest that appraisal 
behavior in the US, UK and New Zealand is non-normative and that these findings are 
not dependent on geographical familiarity.   
Behavioral real estate studies examining the non-normative behavior of appraisers can be 
distinguished into two streams: Anchoring studies investigate the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic bias and feedback studies focus on the impact of client and market 
feedback on value adjustments. Both streams of literature are reviewed in the following 
sections. As feedback studies are in the focus of this study, the review of anchoring 
studies is condensed.  
2.1.2 Anchoring studies 
The environment in which appraisers make valuation judgments is characterized by 
uncertainty, complexity and constant changes. With regard to the limited information 
processing ability of humans (Simon, 1978; Simon and Newell, 1972), the use of 
heuristics (short cuts or production rules) allows appraisers to acquire relevant data and 
solve familiar problems more efficiently and simple. However, heuristics can lead to 
systematic judgment biases, for example, if problem-solving tasks or characteristics of a 
problem are unpredictable, uncertain and difficult. (For an in-depth review and 
discussion, see Hardin, 1999) Heuristic biases represent a serious threat to the 
unbiasedness and independence assumption of valuations. A number of heuristics and 
heuristic biases have been identified (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and investigated in 
real estate negotiations (e.g. Diaz, Zhao and Black, 1999), valuation (e.g. Diaz, 1997; 
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Hansz and Diaz, 2001; Gallimore, 1996), investment (e.g. Clauretie and Thistle, 2007; 
Roberts and Henneberry, 2007; Lambson, McQueen and Slade, 2004), lending (e.g. 
Hardin, 1997) and pricing (e.g. Northcraft and Neale, 1987).  
The anchoring and adjustment bias is of particular importance to real estate valuation as 
appraisers frequently have knowledge of pending sales prices (Gallimore and Wolverton, 
1997), previous value estimates, pending mortgage amounts, transaction or listing prices. 
Anchoring and adjustment represents a heuristic in which individuals start from an initial 
value (“anchor”) and then adjust upwards or downwards to yield a judgment. Insufficient 
adjustment leads to a bias of the final estimate towards the anchor. (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974) If appraisers choose incorrect anchors or make insufficient 
adjustments, the resulting valuations are biased away from the true market value. With 
regard to the importance of objective valuations to mortgage lending, investment and 
portfolio management such a violation of the unbiasedness assumption represents a 
tremendous problem to the real estate industry.  
Studies on the anchoring and adjustment bias in valuation have shown that novice and 
expert appraisers base their value judgments on various external (suggested) and internal 
(self-established) anchors. A number of external anchors affecting appraisers have been 
identified previously: Northcraft and Neale (1987) use brokers and find that both expert 
and student subjects anchor their estimates of appraised value, advertised selling price, a 
reasonable purchasing price and lowest offering price on the listing price of residential 
property. The credibility of an anchor, defined as its distance from the true market value, 
does not affect the strength of the bias. Gallimore (1994) finds support that expert 
appraisers base their judgment of property price variability on external anchors. Diaz 
   12 
(1997) analyzes the impact of the value judgment of an anonymous expert on the value 
judgment of apprentice and expert appraisers for a commercial property in an area they 
are familiar with. Although the results are in the expected direction suggesting the 
presence of an anchoring bias, the results are insignificant. Diaz and Hansz (1997) find 
that commercial expert appraisers unfamiliar with a geographic area anchored their value 
estimate on the value judgment of an anonymous expert. Gallimore and Wolverton 
(1997) show that knowledge of the pending sales price introduces a valuation bias by 
affecting the selection of comparable sales. In their study, appraisers in the UK and US 
anchor their value estimates on the pending sales price of the residential subject property. 
Wolverton (1996) finds that the knowledge of sales price, but not listing price, biases the 
comparable sales selection in a residential valuation. Hansz (2004b) provides evidence 
that expert appraisers use the prior transaction price of a commercial subject property as 
anchor. Diaz and Hansz (2001) test the anchoring behavior of expert appraisers on a 
number of different reference points. The reference points used are the value judgment of 
an anonymous appraiser, the unclosed current contract price of the subject property and a 
highly comparable property. The authors find that these anchors bias the value judgment 
of commercial real estate appraisers to varying degrees depending on whether these 
reference points are explicitly or implicitly sanctioned by the normative appraisal 
process. Cypher and Hansz (2003) find no evidence that expert commercial appraisers 
anchor on assessed value reference points. Tidwell (2011) is the first one to investigate 
whether decision tools such as CoStar reduce the anchoring bias in valuation judgments. 
The author finds that commercial appraisers without access to CoStar anchor on external 
reference points (opinion of an anonymous expert) to some extent while appraisers with 
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access to CoStar are not susceptible to external anchors. However, no statistical 
difference is found for the mean value judgment of appraisers in the CoStar and non-
CoStar group suggesting that CoStar is unable to debias appraisers.  
Besides external anchors, appraisers have been found to also use internal anchors. Diaz 
and Wolverton (1998) investigate the anchoring bias as an alternative explanation of 
appraisal smoothing. They find that when appraisers update appraisals of the same 
commercial property (multi-family) they make insufficient temporal adjustments and fail 
to weigh new information appropriately. Havard (1999) investigates whether appraisers 
use previous valuation judgments as anchor. Using student appraisers, he finds that 
commercial appraisers indeed anchor on previous valuations of the same property. 
Additionally, he shows that appraisers are more willing to adjust a previous (suggested) 
low value estimate upwards than a previous (suggested) high estimate downwards. This 
study was conducted in the same rising real estate market environment as Hansz (1999) 
and Hansz and Diaz (2001), which may explain the similar findings. The findings of 
Clayton, Geltner and Hamilton (2001) additionally show an anchoring behavior of 
appraisers on earlier valuations resulting in insufficient adjustments. The authors 
conclude that the extent to which appraisers anchor on previous value judgments, i.e. 
weighing previous valuations and new information, depends on the phase of the market 
cycle, i.e. the related quality and quantity of information.  
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2.1.3  Feedback studies 
2.1.3.1       Client feedback 
Appraisers are influenced by client and market feedback. The majority of feedback 
studies takes a principal-agent perspective and analyzes the impact of client feedback on 
valuation judgments. Client feedback in this context includes client pressure, but is not 
limited to it. Levy and Schuck (2005, 1999) provide an overview of the motivations for 
and methods of client influence on appraisers. Wolverton and Gallimore (1999) 
investigate the impact of different dimensions of outcome feedback provided by clients 
on residential and commercial appraisers. The authors distinguish environmental 
perception feedback (e.g. Client asks to consider other comparables.), coercive feedback 
(e.g. Client pressures appraiser into increasing the estimate by threatening to send less 
work and/or remove appraiser from list.) and positive reinforcement feedback (e.g. Client 
does not discuss value judgment, is grateful and/or sends more work). Using a survey, the 
authors find evidence that client pressure (environmental perception and coercive 
feedback) leads appraisers to perceive their role in the lending process as validating the 
anticipated sales price instead of determining the objective market value, as outlined by 
the normative valuation process. Thus, if the value estimate is below the anticipated sales 
price, feedback by lenders is likely to influence appraisers to adjust their valuation 
judgment upwards. Positive reinforcement feedback on the other hand results in a more 
normative judgment behavior of appraisers and thus is likely to improve valuation 
judgment performance. Studies replicating Wolverton and Gallimore (1999) in Nigeria 
(Amidu, Aluko and Hansz, 2008) and the UK (Gallimore and Wolverton, 2000) yield 
varying results, which are likely due to differences in culture, business and training. 
Hansz (2004a) investigates the impact of client feedback on commercial valuation 
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judgments. He finds that appraisers facing client pressure in form of a pending mortgage 
amount make significantly higher value judgments than appraisers without this feedback. 
Using a different methodology than Hansz (2004a) and focusing on residential appraisers, 
Diaz and Hansz (2010) come to the same conclusion that client feedback (pressure) 
biases valuation judgments. Kinnard, Lenk and Worzala (1997) conclude that client size, 
proxying for the dependence of an appraiser on a client’s business, has a direct effect on a 
decision of a commercial appraiser to revise value judgments in order to accommodate 
adjustments requested by the client. The size of the requested adjustment however, has no 
impact on the behavior of an appraiser. 
2.1.3.2      Market feedback 
The impact of market feedback on valuation judgment has received little attention in the 
behavioral real estate literature so far. Based on Hansz’ (1999) dissertation, Hansz and 
Diaz (2001) investigate the impact of market feedback on commercial real estate 
valuation judgments in a pre-posttest design. The authors focus on simple outcome 
feedback in form of transaction price information received after the initial valuation 
judgment was made. The authors find transaction price feedback on a previously valued 
property affects the subsequent value judgment for an unrelated property. However, 
contrary to normative expectations, the impact of market feedback on value judgments is 
not symmetrical. Expert subjects in the experiment give a higher weight to the “too low” 
feedback. If market feedback suggests the previous valuation was too low, subsequent 
unrelated valuation judgments are significantly higher. Receipt of a “too high” feedback 
does not lead to significantly lower subsequent value judgments for an unrelated 
property. Although Hansz and Diaz (2001) have no definite explanation for the 
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asymmetric response, they provide three hypotheses: The first one is appraiser-client 
considerations, which is in line with the literature on client feedback and valuation 
judgment (e.g. Wolverton and Gallimore, 1999). As discussed, these studies show that 
client demands induce an upward bias in valuations. Cho and Megbolugbe (1997) find 
that 80% of all valuations reviewed in their study are equal to or higher than the 
transaction price (0 to 5%). The authors argue that this bias is the result of a strong 
interest in higher value estimates by all parties involved in mortgage lending. Appraisers 
may thus unconsciously react to “too low” feedback by automatically adjusting 
subsequent value judgments upwards. This argument emphasizes the link between client 
and market feedback: The latter implicitly includes the former. The second hypothesis is 
optimism in the real estate market and the assumption of rising real estate values. This 
optimism would result in appraisers putting a higher weight on positive information and 
under-reacting to negative information. The third hypothesis is a reduced conservatism 
bias. Faced with uncertainty, appraisers exhibit conservatism in their valuation 
judgments. Outcome feedback such as transaction prices provides appraisers with 
additional information about market conditions, which increases confidence and reduces 
uncertainty. The decreased uncertainty about market conditions is likely to lead to an 
upward bias.   
2.1.3.3     Outcome feedback as market feedback 
Hansz and Diaz (2001) define market feedback in form of transaction price feedback as 
simple outcome feedback. While a detailed discussion of the existing literature on 
outcome feedback is beyond the scope of this chapter, the following section briefly 
reviews this type of feedback. The majority of studies in accounting/auditing and 
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forecasting, two fields in which feedback and expert judgment have been extensively 
studied, conclude that judgment with feedback is better than judgment without feedback 
(e.g. Önkal and Muradoglu, 1995; Hirst and Luckett, 1992). While the results are mixed, 
a number of studies in psychology, accounting and forecasting has shown that feedback 
can improve accuracy of judgments and quality of decision-making (e.g. Remus, 
O’Connor and Griggs, 1996; Subbotin, 1996; Önkal and Muradoglu, 1995; Hirst and 
Luckett, 1992) as it allows individuals to acquire new information, learn and thus develop 
expertise. Outcome feedback can be defined as “information about the realization of a 
previously predicted event” (Önkal and Muradoglu, 1995) and provides information 
about the correctness of a judgment (Leung and Trotman, 2008). It has been found to 
increase the confidence and even overconfidence of subjects. (Goodwin et al., 2004; 
Subbotin, 1996) Advantages of outcome feedback are its ease of computability and 
understandability. Compared to other feedback types based on averages, outcome 
feedback introduces a bias towards the most recent value or data point. Goodwin et al. 
(2004) find if interval forecasts are the desired outcome, the provision of outcome 
feedback (with labels) improves confidence intervals. . In determining value estimates, 
appraisers work with an interval of values they are confident with. Outcome feedback 
may thus be able to improve value estimate confidence intervals. Remus, O’Connor and 
Griggs (1996) argue that outcome feedback may be particularly good when forecasting in 
a task environment with recurrent forecasts and unexpected turning points. Such a task 
environment is given in real estate valuation where appraisers are faced with unexpected 
changes in real estate market conditions and recurrent appraisals. Thus, outcome 
feedback theoretically may be beneficial to real estate appraisers. 
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Outcome feedback appears to be most effective for linear, highly predictable and low 
complexity tasks. (Leung and Trotman, 2005; Goodwin et al., 2004; Hirst and Luckett, 
1992) Bonner and Walker (1994) defined two conditions for outcome feedback to be 
effective: (1) the task has to be sufficiently simple such as a small number of cues, highly 
predictable or simplified so that experimental subjects, after receiving feedback, can 
reason backwards from the realized outcome to the different steps of their cognitive 
strategies in order to develop explanations for the outcome; (2) subjects have a causal 
theory of the domain, i.e. prior knowledge, before receiving feedback. Hirst and Luckett 
(1992) assume that the task of auditor performance evaluation is highly predictable and 
decision makers possess a high knowledge of this task. With these assumptions, outcome 
feedback has been found to improve judgment as it allows subjects to acquire task 
knowledge over time. The improved task knowledge (learning) from outcome feedback 
results in an improvement in the accuracy of judgments even when task predictability is 
less than perfect (Hirst, Luckett and Trotman, 1999), which is a much more realistic 
assumption for fields such as auditing or real estate. Using an experimental design in 
which auditors have to conduct an unfamiliar real estate valuation, Earley (2003) finds 
that if outcome feedback is provided before auditors are asked to self-explain the 
outcome, their performance is improved. Thus outcome feedback is able to improve the 
reasoning ability of auditors when faced with a new problem.  
While previous research in psychology and accounting/auditing literature may suggest 
outcome feedback could improve real estate appraisal judgment, the focus of this study is 
on whether transaction price (outcome) feedback introduces a bias in valuation judgment. 
The experiment is designed correspondingly (e.g. valuation cases set in two different 
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geographical markets). An analysis of the beneficial properties of outcome feedback to 
real estate appraisal is beyond the scope of this study, but represents a starting point for 
further research into feedback and real estate valuation.   
2.2 Changes to the appraisal task environment and industry 
Since Hansz (1999) and Hansz and Diaz (2001) conducted their experiments the appraisal 
task environment, particularly of residential appraisers, experienced two tremendous 
changes. Firstly, residential and commercial real estate market conditions have changed 
significantly. The above studies were conducted in rising or booming commercial real 
estate markets. Expert appraiser subjects in these studies were likely to be relatively 
optimistic and used to clients requesting value judgments at the upper end of the 
justifiable value range. Anticipating increasing market values, appraisers were more 
likely to feel comfortable to accommodate these client requests. The collapse of the US 
housing bubble in 2007 and the resulting financial and economic crisis led to a depressed 
residential real estate market characterized by negative equity, low transaction volume, 
foreclosures and short-sales. Following the downturn of the economy, commercial real 
estate markets have experienced high vacancies, negative absorption, rising cap rates and 
falling rents. These depressed real estate markets affect client behavior and expectations 
as well as market sentiment: Clients such as banks and other mortgage lenders are more 
conservative in underwriting standards and equity contribution requirements. Faced with 
stagnant or declining real estate values and increased defaults in a depressed market, 
lenders are interested in reducing their exposure to mortgage default risk. Client demands 
for upwardly adjusted value judgments are not likely in a depressed market. Rather, 
clients are more likely to be interested in conservative estimates at the lower end of the 
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justifiable value range. Furthermore, a depressed real estate market and prevalent 
pessimistic market sentiment are likely to eliminate any optimism appraisers might have 
about the development of values and prices.  
Additionally, a depressed market represents a tremendous challenge to the estimation of 
the true market value. Such a market is characterized by a significantly reduced number 
of buyers, a pessimistic market sentiment and future expectations, which lead to a 
reduction in transactions. The reduced availability of transaction information reduces 
available sales comparables. Reduced market activity not only affects the sales 
comparison approach to valuation, but also the cost approach (e.g. fewer comparable 
sales for land valuation) and the income approach (e.g. unreliable multiplier and 
capitalization rate information based on fewer comparable sales) for commercial 
properties. A depressed market and the resulting uncertainty about, for example market 
conditions, comparable sales, capitalization rates or future trends, are likely to affect 
valuation judgments and adjustments. McAllister et al. (2003) argue that appraisers, when 
faced with a lack of transaction data, react to such a changed property market in three 
ways: they either make no adjustment, a delayed adjustment or a conservative 
adjustment. The authors’ findings suggest that appraisers are less likely to make extreme 
adjustments reflecting the full downward trend in the commercial real estate market. This 
finding is in line with the conservatism bias argument in Hansz and Diaz (2001).  
The second change to the appraisal task environment affects mostly residential 
appraisers. The involvement of residential appraisers in the most recent housing crisis has 
resulted in a number of changes to the residential appraisal industry in terms of 
legislation, litigation and structure. Client feedback and/or pressure on appraisers as 
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investigated by Wolverton and Gallimore (1999) and Hansz (2004a) has been identified 
as one of the factors contributing to inflated real estate values and faulty mortgages. As a 
consequence, legislation such as the 2008 Home Valuation Code of Conduct (HVCC), 
effective as of May 1 2009, and the 2010 Dodd-Frank regulatory financial reform bill, 
effective as of July 21 2010, have been passed to ensure the independence of residential 
appraisers from clients in general and lenders in particular. The HVCC requires the 
separation of valuation and the lender’s sale and loan production functions for residential 
mortgages to be sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This separation is achieved by 
placing an appraisal management company (AMC) between lender and appraiser. The 
AMC selects and contracts individual appraisers. (Abernethy and Hollans, 2010) Local 
banks or credit unions that don’t resale mortgages in the secondary mortgage market are 
not required to use AMCs. The Federal Reserve Board’s Interim Final Rule, mandated by 
the Dodd-Frank regulatory financial reform bill, goes further than the HVCC and requires 
the independence of appraisers from the influence or pressure of any party with an 
interest in a particular real estate transaction. (Anonymous, 2010) In addition to federal 
legislation, most states passed laws to ensure the independence of appraisers from 
lenders. (Garber, 2009)  
This new legislation is complemented by increased residential appraiser licensing and 
certification requirements. Effective as of January 1, 2008, the Appraiser Qualifications 
Board (AQB) introduced revised licensing criteria, which include increased education 
and experience requirements. (Appraiser Qualifications Board, 2010) The revised 
requirements aim at improving the quality of appraisals and reducing the number of 
insufficiently qualified appraisers. Federal agencies such as the Federal Housing 
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Administration (FHA) have also increased their requirements for residential appraisers: 
In order to work for the FHA, appraisers have to be certified and not just licensed. 
(Rattermann, 2010)  
In the aftermath of collapse of the housing bubble and subprime mortgage crisis, 
residential appraisers have been subject to litigation holding them accountable for their 
perceived contribution to the crisis. The Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) has 
filed lawsuits against residential appraisers, who conducted appraisals at the height of the 
residential real estate market boom for mortgages originated by banks that subsequently 
failed (e.g. IndyMac). The FDIC targets particularly appraisers with errors & omission 
insurance. (Mook, 2011) Other FDIC lawsuits were filed against appraisal management 
companies for hiring unqualified appraisers and conducting faulty appraisals. (Ulam, 
2011; Puente, 2011) The outcome of these lawsuits will be groundbreaking for 
subsequent lawsuits by private parties such as mortgage-backed security investors. 
(Ulam, 2011)  
Besides legislation and litigation, the residential appraisal industry has experienced other 
structural changes. The increased importance of AMCs, particularly as a result of the 
HVCC, has resulted in a reduction of fees for individual appraisers, as the fee paid by 
clients is split between AMC and appraiser (Alen, 2011). Lower fees and less work due 
to a depressed housing market have resulted in appraisers, particularly senior and 
experienced, leaving the industry. Combined with reduced recruitment, these 
developments may negatively affect the quality of appraisals and the ability of the 
appraisal industry to serve clients in a rising market in the future. (Lepro, 2011) New 
competition for appraisers has also arisen from automated valuation systems that are 
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frequently used by residential brokers and homebuyers/sellers (Rattermann, 2010; 
Hurley, 2007) and brokers making value judgments. Depressed residential real estate 
market conditions have increased the importance of the broker price opinion (BPO), 
which has been used increasingly as a tool for foreclosure, short-sales and loan 
modifications. As brokers do not have the same education as appraisers, a number of 
states have developed legislation to restrict BPOs to providing sellers and buyers with a 
listing or purchase price and avoiding the use of BPOs particularly for mortgage lending. 
(Garber 2009) Finally, the recent real estate crisis and the involvement of appraisers have 
sparked an industry-wide debate about issues such as value definitions and valuation 
principles (Hanford, 2011; Parli and Fisher, 2010; Quentin, 2009) and the ways in which 
appraisers can avoid mortgage fraud. (Martin, 2009) 
In conclusion, the appraisal task environment, particularly of residential appraisers, has 
changed significantly since Hansz (1999) and Hansz and Diaz (2001) conducted their 
experiments. Depressed housing market conditions, risk-averse and conservative lenders, 
the increased risk of being sued for value judgments, legislative and structural changes to 
the residential appraisal industry are likely to affect the direction of the response of 
appraisers to transaction price market feedback. The recent study of Tidwell (2011) finds 
supporting evidence that appraiser behavior is affected by real estate market conditions. 
The author shows that commercial appraisers anchor asymmetrically on low reference 
points in a falling market resulting in lower value judgments.  
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3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Hypotheses 
The findings of Hansz (2004a) and Diaz and Hansz (2010) suggest that, despite their 
differences, commercial and residential appraisers behave similarly when exposed to 
client feedback. I focus on market feedback, which implicitly includes client feedback 
(Hansz and Diaz, 2001), and expect an asymmetric response of residential appraisers to 
market feedback: If the upward bias to market feedback found in Hansz and Diaz (2001) 
and Hansz (1999) is the result of upward-trending real estate market conditions, I expect 
an downward bias in a depressed market. Based on the previous literature review and 
discussion of the current residential appraisal task environment, I test the following 
research hypotheses, which translate into testable hypotheses as shown in Table 1 and 2.  
H1: In a depressed market, market feedback in form of the realized transaction price of a 
previously valued residential property asymmetrically biases the subsequent 
valuation judgment for an unrelated property.  
H1a: Compared to a control group receiving no feedback, residential expert 
appraisers receiving the feedback that their previous value estimates 
were “too low” with regard to the realized transaction price don’t make 
higher subsequent value judgments on an unrelated property.  
H1b: Compared to a control group receiving no feedback, residential expert 
appraisers receiving the feedback that their previous value estimates 
were “too high” with regard to the realized transaction price make 
lower subsequent value judgments on an unrelated property.  
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Table 1: Testable Hypotheses 
Research 
hypotheses 
Null hypotheses Alternative hypotheses 
RH1a 
 
H0: DIFFVALtoo low= DIFFVALNF HA: DIFFVALtoo low ≠ DIFFVALNF  
RH1b 
 
H0: DIFFVALtoo high  ≤ DIFFVALNF  HA: DIFFVALtoo high>DIFFVALNF 
Table 2: Testable Hypotheses (Robustness Check) 
RH1 H0: DIFFVALNF=DIFFVALtoo low= 
DIFFVALLtoo high 
HA: not all group means are equal 
Note: In the above table, DIFFVALNF indicates the mean of the difference between the estimates 
for valuation case 2 and 1 (V2-V1) for the “no feedback” control group, DIFFVALtoo low indicates 
the mean of V2-V1 for the “too low” feedback treatment group and DIFFVALtoo high indicates the 
mean of V2-V1 for the “too high” feedback treatment group. DIFFVAL for each subject is 
multiplied by (-1) to make it a positive number.  
 
3.2 Experimental design 
To test my hypotheses, I design a true (randomized) experiment. As subjects are aware of 
their participation in the experiment and the experiment is controlled, it also represents a 
laboratory experiment. “Experimentation” hereby represents the research strategy and 
“laboratory” the research setting. (Fromkin and Streufert, 1976) The structure or design 
of my experiment is shown in Table 3. I employ a pre-posttest experiment to test the 
cause-effect relationship between market feedback and value judgment. This experiment 
is designed to meet the three criteria of a causal relationship: temporal precedence, 
covariation of cause and effect as well as no alternative explanations.  (Trochim and 
Donnelly, 2008) 
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As shown in Table 3, my experiment has one factor fixed at three levels. Trochim and 
Donnelly (2008) define factorial designs as signal-enhancing experimental designs. My 
factor or independent variable is transaction price (market) feedback. This factor has 
three levels: “too high”, “too low” and no feedback. For internal validity reasons (see 
section 3.3) and construct validity reasons (see section 3.5), I also include a pre-posttest 
(“no feedback”) control group that doesn’t receive any feedback and a posttest-only 
validity control group. 
Table 3: Experimental Design 
Transaction price feedback group: “too low”  R O X1 O 
Transaction price feedback group: “too high” R O X2 O 
No feedback control group R O  O 
Validity control group R   O 
Note: In the above table “R” indicates random assignment, “O” an observation or measure and “X” a 
treatment.  
The experimental design is implemented as follows: At the beginning of the experiment 
subjects are randomly assigned to one of the two treatment groups and two control 
groups. Subjects in all groups, except the posttest-only validity control group, are given 
valuation case 1 (see Appendix A). Subjects are asked to complete valuation case 1 and 
make a value judgment. The valuation judgment is captured as point estimate (per acre 
and total). This valuation case represents the pretest and yields the first observation or 
measure. The entire measurement instrument is discussed in section 3.5 (construct 
validity). After completion of the first valuation case, subjects in the treatment groups 
receive their treatment. Subsequently, subjects of all groups, including the posttest-only 
validity control group, are given a second valuation case of an unrelated property (See 
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Appendix B). After completion of this case, subjects are asked to provide their second 
value estimate (second measure) as point estimate and range. The experiment is 
concluded with an exit questionnaire (Appendix C). 
Validity represents the best approximation of the truth for a given conclusion. Four types 
of validity are used to judge the quality of research: internal validity, external validity, 
construct validity and (statistical) conclusion validity. (Trochim and Donnelly, 2008) For 
the remainder of this chapter, these different validity types represent the outline for the 
discussion of my research design (internal, external and construct validity) and analysis 
of the experimental data (conclusion validity).  
 
3.3 Internal validity and causality 
Internal validity refers to the strength of inferences about the causal or cause-effect 
relationship between variables. (Trochim and Donnelly, 2008) The purpose of this study 
is the analysis of the causal relationship between market feedback and valuation 
judgment. Thus, internal validity is a crucial consideration for the experimental design. 
To assess whether the treatment had an effect on (caused) the outcome, alternative 
explanations (confounding effects) have to be eliminated. The advantage of experiments 
is that alternative explanations can be controlled for and one particular causal relationship 
can be isolated.  
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3.3.1 Treatment 
The transaction price feedback treatment used to test the hypothesized causal relationship 
in a depressed market is based on Hansz (1999). Neither the treatment nor the valuation 
cases include any information about real estate market trends. The transaction price 
feedback is administered in form of the following hand-written note from the seller’s 
broker. This treatment is adapted from Hansz (1999). 
“The 1 acre site known as 239 Devonwood Drive in Sandy Springs sold on October 17, 
2011 for $ ….. per acre. This sale was considered to be a market value transaction of the 
fee simple estate. The site was purchased by Ruth and Wesley Watkins. The grantees 
financed the purchase with a 30-year fixed rate mortgage at current market interest 
rates.”   
In line with Hansz (1999), the transaction prices to be entered in the sales report represent 
a 15% decrease (“too high”) and +15% increase (“too low”) from the individual 
appraiser’s estimate for valuation case 1. Although larger deviations may reflect the total 
loss in home values since the height of the housing market in 2007 more appropriately, 
average house prices in the Portland MSA in September 2011 were only 5.7% lower than 
September 2010 prices (Case-Shiller Index). A 15% range around the estimates for 
valuation case 1 is considered appropriate for the experimental manipulation. A larger 
range, say 25%, could be considered unrealistic or out of context by experimental 
subjects and thus fail to be a powerful manipulation, particularly for the “too low” 
feedback group. The treatment is administered as follows: While subjects are working on 
the first valuation case, the experimenter sitting opposite the subjects is working on a 
laptop and hiding a notepad with the seller’s broker note from the subject’s view. In the 
note, the per-acre sales price is left blank. While the subjects write down their per acre 
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estimate for the first case, the experimenter uses the calculator on the laptop to calculate 
the treatment transaction price. This procedure ensures that the amount used in the 
treatment is exactly 15% above or below the subject’s estimate for the first valuation 
case. The experimenter then enters the calculated amount into the hand-written note. This 
procedure aims at ensuring that subjects do not notice the manipulation, i.e. calculation of 
and entering of the number into the broker’s note. Before the second case is handed to 
subjects, the experimenter provides subjects with the note identifying it as information on 
the property they just valued.  
3.3.2 Manipulation checks 
This study includes two manipulation checks. The purpose of manipulation checks is to 
assess whether the experimental manipulation has worked. (Fromkin and Streufert, 1976) 
Manipulation checks help in the interpretation of findings, particularly insignificant ones. 
If an experiment yields insignificant results, manipulation checks can help decide 
whether this insignificance is due to the absence of a hypothesized relationship or the 
non-reception of the experimental treatment by subjects.  
The implicit manipulation in the experiment are real estate market conditions: The 
findings of Hansz (1999) and Hansz and Diaz (2001) suggest that experimental subjects 
subconsciously introduced current real estate market conditions into the experiment (e.g. 
optimism and client expectations) leading to the upward bias. The experiment in hand is 
conducted in the metro Portland area from October to December 2011. At the time of this 
study, the housing market in Portland had been experiencing depressed conditions. The 
average home prices in Portland continued to fall in 2011 and values dropped by 30.6% 
since the market peak in 2007, which represents a higher loss than the national average of 
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29.5%. (Manning, 2011) In the second quarter of 2011, foreclosures accounted for 33% 
of all sales in Oregon, placing the state at position 9 in the national ranking of foreclosure 
sales (by percentage and state; Njus, 2011). To test whether subjects are experiencing 
depressed housing market conditions I use a manipulation check. The following question 
is included in the final questionnaire: “Overall, in what phase of the market cycle do you 
think the housing market in the metro Portland area is currently in?” Subjects can 
choose between the answers: (1) “upward-trending”, (2) “boom”, (3) “downward-
trending”, (4) “bottom” or (5) “not sure”. If experimental subjects are currently 
experiencing negative real estate market conditions, I expect the mean answer to this 
question to be high, i.e. somewhere between 3 and 4 assuming that subjects who 
answered (5) are excluded from the mean calculation.  
I also include a second manipulation check: As discussed in chapter 2 and Hansz and 
Diaz (2001), outcome feedback has been found to increase confidence and reduce 
uncertainty. A second manipulation check tests whether the provided feedback makes 
subjects in the treatment groups more confident about their value judgment. The 
following question in the final questionnaire, to be completed by subjects after the second 
valuation case, tests for this effect of the manipulation: “Do you feel confident about your 
value estimate?”. Subjects are asked to rate their confidence for each valuation case and 
are given a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 5 (very confident). 
This manipulation check is adapted from Hansz (1999). If market feedback (transaction 
price) results in higher confidence, I expect the mean change in confidence between cases 
for the treatment groups to differ from the ones for the control groups (be higher) and less 
variance in the second valuation case estimates for the treatment groups.  
   31 
3.3.3 Threats to internal validity 
A number of threats to internal validity exist. (Trochim and Donnelly, 2008; Cook and 
Campbell, 1976) In a pre-posttest experiment introducing a pre-posttest control group 
into the experimental design can eliminate single group threats, such as the history, 
maturity and instrumentation threat. As a consequence, a pre-posttest no-feedback control 
group complements the market feedback treatment groups in the experimental design. As 
treatment and control group face the same issues (e.g. maturity, regression to the mean), 
any difference between these groups is the result of the experimental manipulation. The 
testing threat to internal validity, i.e. taking the test affects how subjects score on pre and 
post-test (Trochim and Donnelly, 2008), is addressed by implementing a posttest-only 
(validity) control group analogously to Hansz (1999) and Hansz and Diaz (2001). A 
significant difference in the value estimates for the second valuation case of pre-posttest 
control group and posttest-only control group would indicate a testing bias. The resulting 
hypotheses for the testing bias are H0: VC=NF and HA: VC≠NF, where VC is the mean 
estimate for the second valuation case of the posttest-only control group (validity control) 
and NF is the mean estimate for the second valuation case of the pre-posttest control 
group (“no feedback” group). If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, no testing bias is 
present.  
At the multi-group level, selection bias and its various forms represent a serious threat to 
internal validity. It is the result of any pre-treatment differences between groups and leads 
to post-treatment difference that are not the result of experimental manipulation. 
(Trochim and Donnelly, 2008; Cook and Campbell, 1976) Selection bias is eliminated by 
randomly assigning subjects to the different groups. As shown in Table 3, the random 
   32 
assignment occurs before the pretest. The random assignment is implemented as follows: 
In preparation for the experiment, the names of all subjects, identified as discussed in 
section 3.4, are entered into a MS Excel spreadsheet. Each of the four experimental 
groups is assigned a number from 1 to 4 (1=too low, 2=too high, 3= pre-posttest control, 
4= validity control). The RandBetween function in Excel is then used to assign a number 
between 1 and 4 to each subject, reflecting the respective groups.   
Social interaction threats as discussed in Trochim and Donnelly (2008) and Cook and 
Campbell (1976) are not considered relevant with regard to the experimental design. 
However, to avoid the diffusion of treatment, appraisers who take the experiment at the 
same time in the same location and who are likely assigned to different groups are not 
allowed to communicate with each other during the experiment.  
3.4 External validity and sample selection 
3.4.1 Sampling frame and sample size 
External validity refers to the degree to which the findings of a study can be generalized 
to other individuals in other times and places. (Trochim and Donelly, 2008; Cook and 
Campbell, 1976) One goal of this study is to obtain conclusions that are generalizable to 
residential real estate appraisers, which is the population of interest. In this context, the 
theoretical and accessible populations have to be distinguished (Trochim and Donelly, 
2008): The theoretical population is comprised of all practicing residential real estate 
appraisers in the US while the accessible population comprises of all practicing 
residential real estate appraisers in the metro Portland area. The sampling frame for this 
study consists of all currently practicing residential real estate appraisers in the metro 
Portland area, who are Oregon State certified residential appraisers. The Portland 
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Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) consists of the counties Clackamas, Columbia, 
Multnomah, Yamhill and Washington in Oregon and the counties Clark and Skamania in 
Washington.  
In line with the majority of previous behavioral real estate studies (e.g. Diaz and Hansz, 
2001; Hansz and Diaz, 2001; Diaz and Hansz, 1997), I use expert subjects instead of 
student subjects as expert and non-expert subjects may behave differently. (Diaz, 1990) 
Using expert appraisers yields a higher degree of generalizability of findings to the 
theoretical population of interest. In line with previous studies (e.g. Tidwell, 2011; Hansz 
and Diaz, 2001) I assign 10 subject to each group, resulting in a total sample size of 40. 
This number of observations per cell represents a trade-off between sufficient statistical 
power and the feasibility of the experiment.  
3.4.2 Participant selection and acquisition 
To eliminate potential threats to external validity (for an in-depth discussion, see Cook 
and Campbell, 1976), I randomly select subjects to be included in my sample. I obtain a 
list of all certified residential appraisers in the State of Oregon, who are registered in the 
Portland MSA from the Oregon Appraiser Certification and Licensure Board (OACLB; 
total: 314). Only active certified residential appraisers are used. Using MS Excel, I assign 
a number to each appraiser and use the RandBetween function to select forty MAI 
appraisers (10 observations per cell). In a next step, I contact individual appraisers by 
email and/or phone to inquire about availability to participate in the study. The 
participant acquisition took place over the period of October to November 2011. If 
contacted appraisers agreed to participate, I set up a meeting to conduct the experiment. 
As most residential appraisers work out of their homes, I conducted the majority of 
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experiments in coffee shops. A few appraisers asked me to meet them in their home 
and/or office. If selected certified residential appraisers declined to participate, the above 
random selection was repeated to determine a replacement. In order to obtain 40 
participants for the main experiment and 6 for the pilot study, 253 appraisers were 
contacted, which translates into a response rate of 18.2%. The majority of contacted 
appraisers did not respond to emails or voice messages, even after repeated attempts. 
Appraisers who were reached but declined participation predominantly named four 
reasons: Some appraisers named “not interested” as reason while others declined because 
their current work schedule didn’t allow any time to meet with me (“busy”). At the time 
my experiments were conducted, interest rates were very low and resulted in an increase 
of refinancing-related valuations. Additionally, the reductions in appraisal fees and 
increases in valuation requirements by AMCs increased the workload of appraisers 
significantly and reduced their availability to participate. A smaller amount of appraisers 
felt uncomfortable with vacant land appraisals, either due to their inexperience or the 
inadequacy of data currently experienced in the Portland MSA. Even after explaining to 
them that the experimental cases are simplified and contain all the information needed, 
they were still reluctant to get involved with anything related to land valuation.  
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3.5 Construct validity and operationalization 
Construct validity represents the degree to which the operationalization reflects the 
theoretical construct (ideal). Operationalization refers to the program or measurement 
instrument used. This type of validity is concerned with the generalizability from the 
operational program or measures to the underlying concept of the measures. The central 
questions of construct validity are: Does the implemented instrument measure what it is 
supposed to measure? How well does the actual measures reflect the underlying theory? 
(Trochim and Donnelly, 2008)  
3.5.1 Measurement instrument 
The measurement instrument consists of two valuation cases of vacant residential land in 
Georgia, which for simplicity reasons require subjects to only use the sales comparison 
approach (i.e. weighing comparable sales). Subjects took on average 20 to 50 minutes to 
complete both valuation cases. Following the majority of existing behavioral real estate 
literature (see Chapter 2), the valuation cases in this experiment are set in a 
geographically unfamiliar location: Appraisers from the metro Portland area (see section 
3.4) are asked to value vacant properties in the metro Atlanta area in Georgia. Valuing 
properties in geographically unfamiliar locations increases uncertainty and complexity 
for subjects and is more likely to increase the effect of market feedback on value 
judgments. Additionally, valuation cases set in geographically familiar locations may 
introduce confounding effects: Experimental subjects have varying experience in 
geographical submarkets in the metro Portland area. For example, some appraisers are 
very active in the Lake Oswego (South-West Portland) while others may be 
predominantly active in East or North Portland. If an experimental case was set in Lake 
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Oswego, more familiar appraisers may introduce additional knowledge about the area and 
subject property into the experiment, which represents a threat to internal validity. 
Valuation cases set in unfamiliar geographical locations eliminate potential confounding 
effects due to varying area expertise of experimental subjects. However, to ensure that 
none of the subjects is familiar with this geographical market, appraisers are asked about 
their familiarity with the Georgia housing market in the final questionnaire. None of the 
experimental subjects had ever done an appraisal in the metro Atlanta area.  
Valuation cases 1 and 2 are adapted from Hansz (1999). Each of the valuation cases 
consists of a problem statement, identification of the subject property, purpose of the 
appraisal, neighborhood data, property data and five comparables. No housing market 
information is provided in the valuation cases. The subject properties are located in 
Sandy Springs in Fulton County, GA (valuation case 1) and Newnan in the neighboring 
Coweta County, GA (valuation case 2). The Sandy Springs subject property has a size of 
0.42 acre and the Newnan subject property of 0.2 acre. The selection of unrelated 
properties in two neighboring counties is in line with Hansz (1999). As the experiment in 
hand is laboratory, the comparable sales in the two valuation cases are hypothetical. 
Initially, the prices per unit ($ per acre) for all comparable sales are taken from Hansz 
(1999) and increased by $200,000. The size of subject and comparable properties is 
chosen to reflect representative residential lot sizes. Sales prices are determined by 
multiplying the (modified) price per acre with the new lot sizes. In line with Hansz 
(1999), sales prices and dates are selected to eliminate any price trend in consecutive 
sales. In this first stage, the transaction dates of the comparable sales are also taken from 
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Hansz (1999) and updated by changing the years to 2010 and 2011 respectively. Subject 
property and comps in both cases have the same zoning and utilities in place.  
3.5.2 Pilot study  
Although the measurement instrument is partially adapted from Hansz (1999), a pilot 
study was conducted to assess potential threats to construct validity and ensure the 
reliability of the measurement instrument. This smaller scale experiment was used to 
fine-tune the measurement instrument before conducting the main experiment with the 
full sample of certified residential appraisers. The pilot study was conducted in the first 
two weeks of October 2011. At the time of the pilot study, no valuation class was offered 
at Portland State University or any of the other organizations offering appraiser education 
in the Portland MSA. Thus, valuation students could not be used for the pilot, as 
previously done by Tidwell (2011) or Hansz (1999). Instead the pilot study was 
conducted with six expert appraisers. First, four appraisers were assigned to each of the 
four experimental groups. While the answers of pilot subjects to the first valuation case 
showed some variability, all subjects gave exactly the same estimate for the second 
valuation case (no variability). After discovering this problem, two additional expert 
appraisers were asked to conduct both valuations, which yielded the same result. Pilot 
study subjects were then asked how they arrived at the estimate for the second case. The 
conclusion was that all subjects simply averaged the five comps sales prices, as they were 
relatively close in value. As a consequence, the experimental cases were revised as 
follows: The differences between comparable sales were increased to avoid the valuation 
approach pilot study subjects took. Consequently, comps vary widely and require main 
experiment subjects to thoroughly evaluate the features of comps against features of the 
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subject property. Increasing the discrepancy of comps transaction prices didn’t reduce 
their credibility as, according to experimental subjects, the vacant residential land market 
at the time of the experiments showed similar characteristics (i.e. sales prices were “all 
over the place”). In addition to the sales prices (total and per acre), the dates of the comps 
were also changed from the initial ones (see 3.5.1). Analogously to Hansz (1999), the 
revised comps of both valuation cases did not show a trend. Table 4 presents an overview 
of the subject properties and final comparables sales for both valuation cases (for more 
information, see Appendix A and B). The valuation date is October 15, 2011. 
 
Table 4: Overview of Subject Property and Comparable Sales 
Valuation case  Property Size 
(in 
acres) 
Sales Date Sales Price 
(total) 
Sales Price 
(per acre) 
1 (Fulton County) Subject  0.42    
 Comp 1 0.93 12/30/2010 $277,280 $298,150 
 Comp 2 0.39 02/17/2011 $159,705 $409,500 
 Comp 3 0.58 07/06/2011 $223,892 $386,020 
 Comp 4 0.65 09/05/2011 $293,345 $451,300 
 Comp 5 0.48 10/01/2011 $149,174 $310,780 
2 (Coweta County) Subject 0.2    
 Comp 1 0.63 02/01/2011 $186,606 $296,200 
 Comp 2 0.2 08/18/2011 $82,140 $410,700 
 Comp 3 0.26 09/10/2011 $58,690 $225,731 
 Comp 4 0.37 03/07/2011 $135,957 $367,450 
 Comp 5 0.18 07/30/2011 $57,657 $320,316 
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3.5.3 Threats to construct validity 
Of the threats to construct validity as discussed in Trochim and Donnelly (2008) and 
Cook and Campbell (1976), the following issues are considered most threatening to the 
quality of this study and are addressed in the experimental design or administration of the 
experiment. The experimenter can’t control for all possible experiences of subjects, 
external to the experiment, which may interact with the experimental treatment. (Trochim 
and Donnelly, 2008) Thus, I address this potential threat by means of the pre-posttest 
control group. Control and treatment groups are exposed to the same real estate market 
conditions. Any difference between treatment and control groups is due to the 
experimental treatment. Social threats to construct validity (Trochim and Donnelly, 2008; 
Cook and Campbell, 1976) are considered minor for this study. Subject may be tempted 
to guess hypotheses and base their behavior on these guesses, not the treatment. Thus, the 
experimental outcome may be rather the result of guessing than treatment. (Trochim and 
Donnelly, 2008) To address this threat, I provide them with general explanations about 
the purpose of this research (investigation into the decision-making behavior of 
residential appraisers). After completing the experiment, subjects were informed about 
the background of the study and the research hypotheses. Evaluation apprehension, i.e. 
evaluation-induced anxieties, is considered no threat as firstly the valuation cases used in 
the experiment are relatively simple and secondly expert appraisers are asked to complete 
a common professional task (valuation). As a consequence, the questionnaire with 
demographic and professional questions is placed at the end of the second valuation case 
instead of at the beginning of the experiment as in Hansz (1999). Placing this 
questionnaire at the end also allows hiding the two manipulation checks better to avoid 
that subjects recognize them as manipulation checks. Lastly, to reduce potential biases 
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from the influence of the experimenter on the subjects (experimenter expectancies), all 
subjects are provided with the same written explanations in the valuation cases (e.g. 
objective of valuation). If subjects have case-related questions during the experiment, the 
experimenter provided an answer as long as it only served to clarify provided 
information.  
3.6 Conclusion validity and statistical analysis 
Conclusion validity or statistical conclusion validity is important not for the design of an 
experiment, but the analysis of experimental data. It refers to the degree to which 
conclusions or inferences made from the experimental data are credible and reasonable. 
(Trochim and Donnelly, 2008) While internal validity is concerned with systematic bias 
and whether a relationship is causal, conclusion validity focuses on sources of error 
variance and the appropriate use of statistical tests. (Cook and Campbell, 1976)  
3.6.1 Diagnostics and assumption testing 
To test my hypotheses as shown in Table 1, I analyze my experimental data with 
parametric and non-parametric tests such as the independent sample t-test and the Mann-
Whitney U test. Parametric tests are more powerful, however, they are based on the 
assumption of a normally distributed population. As postulated by the Central Limit 
Theorem (CLT), the sampling distribution of a statistic (e.g. mean) approaches normality, 
regardless of the distribution of the underlying population, if the sample size is 
sufficiently large. While a sample size of 30 is commonly used as guideline, it is 
questionable whether this sample size is sufficiently large to automatically assume 
normality. To determine a sufficiently large sample size, characteristics such as the shape 
of a distribution (e.g. skewness and kurtosis) have to be considered. To eliminate the 
   41 
threat of violated assumptions of statistical tests (Trochim and Donnelly, 2008), I use 
visual and quantitative data diagnostics to test for normality. I use histograms and Q-Q 
plots as visual diagnostic tools and a number of quantitative tests to assess normality. The 
quantitative tests include the Jarque-Bera (JB) test, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, 
the Shapiro-Wilk (SW) test and the Anderson-Darling (AD) test.   
Equality of variance between the groups is another assumption of the parametric t-test. 
The Levene’s test for equality of variances is used to quantitatively test whether the equal 
variance assumption is violated. In this study, the null hypothesis of the Levene’s test is 
that variances between experimental groups are equal.  
3.6.2 Hypothesis testing using independent samples t-test 
If the data are normally distributed and of equal variance, I use the parametric 
independent samples t-test (Student’s t-test) to test the hypotheses as shown in Table 1. 
The t-test is chosen for simplicity, however, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) or 
multiple ordinary least square regression would yield the same results. (Trochim and 
Donnelly, 2008) The t-statistic is calculated as shown in equation 1. Hypothesis RH1a 
requires a two-tailed t-test, while hypothesis RH1b requires a one-tailed t-test. 
tdf =
x1 − x2
s12
n1
+ s2
2
n2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
                           (1) 
Where xn represents the sample mean of an experimental group, sn2  represents the group 
variance and nn represents the group sample size. The degrees of freedom equal the sum 
of both groups minus 2. (Trochim and Donnelly, 2008) 
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3.6.3    Threats to conclusion validity 
In my analysis, I reduce threats to conclusion validity in two ways. The type I error, i.e. 
incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis, represents one threat (Trochim and Donnelly, 
2008) and is mitigated by choosing a significance level of 5%. This translates into a 
critical t-statistic of ± 1.96 for the two-tailed hypothesis (RH1a) and 1.645 for the one-
tailed hypothesis (RH1b) as it implies an upper tail test. The resulting decision rule for the 
two-tailed test is: If |tobserved|≥|tcritical|, reject H0, if not, do not reject H0. The decision rule 
for the one-tailed test is: If tobserved≥tcritical, reject H0; if not, do not reject H0. To address 
the threat of the “fishing and (type 1) error rate problem” (“bouncing alphas”; Trochim 
and Donnelly, 2008; Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002) due to two separate sub-testing 
hypotheses for research hypothesis 1, I combine the testing hypotheses into one as shown 
in Table 2. I then use a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) F-test to test for 
differences in means between the different groups. The experimental design (e.g. random 
sampling, distinct groups, same sample sizes) ensures that the assumptions of an 
ANOVA, such as equal variances and normality, are satisfied by the experimental data. 
The basic idea of the ANOVA F-test is a comparison of the variance between 
experimental groups and the variance within these groups as shown in equation 2. The 
between and within group variances are calculated as shown in equations 3 and 4. If an 
experimental treatment has an effect, the group means would be different and the 
between group variation would exceed the within group variation.  
F − statistic = sbetweengroups
2
swithingroups2
                       (2) 
   43 
sbetweengroups2 =
ni xi − x( )2∑
k −1                        (3)
swithingroups2 =
(xij −∑∑ x )2
n − k            (4) 
Where xi is the sample mean of group i, x  is the mean for the total sample, ni is the 
sample size of group i, k is the number of groups, n is the total sample size and xij is the 
jth observation in group i. The respective degrees of freedom are (k-1) and (n-k). The F-
statistic follows the F-distribution and the critical F-statistic for a given level of the type I 
error, in this study 5%, is derived from the respective table. If the observed F-statistic as 
calculated in equation 2 exceeds the critical F-statistic, the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. However, while ANOVA allows testing for differences in multiple means, it 
does not allow any judgments about which group mean specifically differs and caused 
rejection of the null hypothesis. (Field, 2005) 
Low statistical power, i.e. incorrectly failing to reject (accept) the null hypothesis (high 
type II error), represents an additional threat (Trochim and Donnelly, 2008; Cook and 
Campbell, 1976). Statistical power is defined as (1-type II error) and represents the 
ability to correctly reject the null hypothesis, i.e. finding a relationship in the 
experimental data that indeed exists in reality. For insignificant results I conduct a power 
analysis (for an in-depth discussion, see Cohen et al., 2003 and Field 2005). To assess the 
statistical power of my t-tests I convert the t-statistic into an effect size, r, as shown in 
equation 5. (Field, 2005)  The post-hoc power of my t-tests is then calculated with the 
program G*Power. (For more information, see Erdfelder, Faul and Buchner, 1996)  
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r = t
2
t 2 + df                                        (5)  
3.6.4  Non-parametric robustness checks 
As robustness check for the parametric t-test, due to the small sample size and in case the 
diagnostics reveal a non-normal distribution in the experimental data. I use the Mann-
Whitney U test. This test compares the medians of two groups. It is based on an ordering 
of scores and the assignment of ranks equal to their relative position in the ordered 
sequence. (Field, 2005) The U-statistic for both groups is then calculated as shown in 
equation 6. 
U = n1n2 +
n1(n1 +1)
2 − Rn                (6)  
Where nn is the sample size of the respective groups and Rn is the sum of ranks for either 
group 1 or 2. Significance of the smaller U-statistic is then determined based on the 
respective table or computer program.  
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4 RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical investigation of this study. After an 
overview of the characteristics of experimental subjects, descriptive statistics are 
provided. The third section presents the results of the research hypotheses testing using 
the parametric t-test. It is followed by robustness checks, an analysis of manipulation 
checks and a power analysis.  
4.1 Experimental subject profile 
As show in Table 5, the majority of appraisers who participated in this study is male 
(77.5%). On average, they are 51 years old and had 20 years of experience in residential 
appraisal. The minimum age in the sample is 28 and the maximum 70 years. Experience 
ranges from 5 to 47 years. The majority of subjects has a bachelor degree or higher 
(65%). Residential real estate valuation represents on average 97% of their work 
(minimum: 70%; maximum: 100%) and 45% of participants hold designations or 
certifications in addition to being an Oregon State certified residential appraiser. These 
appraisal designations or certifications include the Senior Residential Appraiser (SRA) by 
the Appraisal Institute, Federal Housing Administration (FHA) certification, the 
Independent Fee Appraiser (IFA) certification by the National Association of 
Independent Fee Appraisers (NAIFA) and the Veterans Affairs (VA) certification.  
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Table 5: Full Sample Profile  
Gender Male 77.5% 
 Female 22.5% 
Age (in years) 50.7 
Experience (in years) 20 
Education High school 2.5% 
 Some college 32.5% 
 Bachelor degree 45% 
 Graduate degree 20% 
Share of residential valuation  97% 
Share of appraisers with additional 
certifications/designations 
45% 
Table 6 presents subject profiles by experimental group. With exception of the “too high” 
feedback group, the majority of appraisers in all groups is male. Subjects in the “too low” 
feedback group are on average 45.3 years old and had 16 years of experience. Subject age 
in this group ranges from 32 to 56 years and experience from 6 to 30 years. The majority 
of subjects (70%) has a bachelor degree or higher and only 20% have an additional 
certification or designation. On average, subjects derive 97% of their work from 
residential appraisal (minimum: 70%; maximum: 100%). 
In the “too high” feedback group, the age of subjects ranges from 39 to 67 years, 
averaging 48.6 years. Appraisers in this group have on average 16.7 years experience in 
residential appraisal, with a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 26 years. 80% of this 
group’s subjects hold a bachelor degree or higher and 50% hold additional certifications 
or designations. On average 98.5% of subject’s work is in residential real estate valuation 
(minimum: 95%; maximum: 100%). 
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Appraisers in the control group, which received no feedback, are on average 56.5 years 
old, with a minimum of 28 and a maximum of 66 years. Their experience ranges from 10 
to 42 years with an average of 26.20 years. 60% of subjects have a bachelor degree or 
higher and 70% hold additional appraisal certifications or designations. On average, 97% 
of subjects’ work is in residential valuation (minimum: 70%; maximum: 100%). 
Lastly, subjects in the validity control group are on average 52.4 years old with a 
minimum of 35 and a maximum of 70 years. Residential appraisal experience ranges 
from 5 to 47 years, averaging at 21.10 years. In this group, half of all appraisers holds a 
bachelor degree or higher and 40% has additional appraisal certifications or designations. 
Appraisers in this group derive on average 95.5% of their work from residential appraisal 
(minimum: 80%; maximum: 100%). 
Table 6: Experimental Group Profiles 
  Too low 
feedback 
Too high 
feedback 
No feedback Validity 
control 
Gender Male 100% 40% 70% 100% 
 Female 0% 60% 30% 0% 
Age (in years) 45.3 48.6 56.5 52.4 
Experience (in years) 16 16.7 26.2 21.10 
Education High school 0% 0% 0% 10% 
 Some college 30% 20% 40% 40% 
 Bachelor degree 50% 60% 40% 30% 
 Graduate degree 20% 20% 20% 20% 
Share of residential valuation  97% 98.5% 97% 95.5% 
Share of appraisers with 
additional 
certifications/designations 
20% 50% 70% 40% 
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In conclusion, the sample profile for the full sample (N=40) and the individual 
experimental groups (observations per cell: 10) show that residential appraisers who 
participated in this study are predominantly middle-aged, very experienced, educated and 
male.  
Reflecting the changes in the residential appraisal task environment as discussed in 
section 2.2, AMCs represent the most important client group (full sample: 62.2%). As 
shown in Table 7, the increased importance of AMCs to the individual appraiser’s 
business is also evident in the experimental groups. Some mortgage lenders, such as local 
banks or credit unions, are not required to use AMCs as intermediaries as they don’t sell 
mortgages to secondary mortgage market entities such as Fannie Mae. These local 
lenders are the second most important source of work for appraisers (17.9%), followed by 
governmental agencies such as FHA or VA (7.5%), other clients such as attorneys (7.2%) 
and individual homeowners/sellers (5.2%).    
However, these sample frequencies hide the stark difference in sources of business 
among subjects: In the full sample, the share of AMC work in an individual appraiser’s 
business ranges from 0% to 100% (mortgage lenders: 0-93%; individual 
homebuyers/sellers: 0-50%; governmental agencies: 0-100%; other clients: 0-80%). 
Appraisers with different clients face different working conditions. For example, most 
AMCs require appraisers to bid for assignments against other appraisers, complete 
assignments within 48 hours after inspection of the property, use comps within the last 
three months (at the most the last six months) and use comps within a certain distance 
from the subject property. None of the appraisers predominantly working for 
governmental agencies or attorneys mentioned such restrictions on their work and fees.  
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Table 7: Appraisal Client Profile 
 Full 
sample 
Too low 
feedback  
Too high 
feedback 
No 
feedback 
Validity 
control 
Mortgage lenders 17.9% 14.6% 18.7% 14% 24.3% 
Individual 
homebuyers/sellers 
5.2% 2.7% 9.7% 4.7% 3.8% 
AMC 62.2% 71.5% 60.8% 61.3% 55.2% 
Governmental 
agencies 
7.5% 2.7% 5% 6% 16.2% 
Other 7.2% 8.5% 5.8% 14% 0.5% 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics and diagnostics 
In preparation for hypotheses testing using the independent samples t-test, the properties 
of the experimental dataset are investigated to assess whether the assumptions of 
normality and equal variances have been violated. Table 8 and Table 9 present an 
overview of descriptive statistics across experimental groups for the first and second 
valuation case respectively. 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics (Valuation Case 1) 
 Too low feedback Too high feedback No feedback 
Mean $167,210 $160,334 $154,792 
Median $164,064 $157,500 $152,341 
Standard deviation $22,169 $16,448 $15,184 
Minimum $134,776 $130,200 $132,510 
Maximum $208,250 $192,000 $180,000 
Range $73,474 $61,800 $47,490 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics (Valuation Case 2) 
 Too low 
feedback 
Too high 
feedback 
No 
feedback 
Validity 
control 
Mean $75,069 $72,034 $69,009 $75,393 
Median $77,500 $76,000 $66,481 $77,500 
Standard deviation $8,075 $12,775 $7,629 $7,193 
Minimum $58,800 $45,000 $60,000 $63,469 
Maximum $84,624 $85,000 $82,000 $82,140 
Range $25,824 $40,000 $22,000 $18,671 
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The parametric independent samples t-test requires normality and equality of variances 
between groups (see section 3.6.1.1). As a starting point, Table 10 presents the moments 
of the distribution derived from value estimates for the second valuation case for all 
experimental groups (full sample). The first moment is $72,876. The third and fourth 
moment suggest that the distribution is not normal. The dataset is negatively skewed  
(-0.795), which indicates a left tail with the majority of data to the right of the mean. A 
kurtosis of 0.344 suggests that the sample data distribution has a steeper peak than the 
normal distribution.  
 
Table 10: Moments of Distribution (Valuation Case 2) 
Mean $72,876 
Standard Deviation $9,217 
Skewness -0.795 
Kurtosis 0.344 
N 40 
 
 
The histogram in Figure 1 visually shows that the data are not normally distributed: At 
the end of the left tail appears to be an outlier, however, this value estimate belongs to the 
“too high” feedback group and is likely the result of experimental manipulation. 
Additionally, the distribution appears to be almost bimodal. Figure 2 presents the Q-Q 
plots for the full sample. These plots also show that the data deviates from normality. The 
detrended normal Q-Q plot shows two outliers (low outlier: too high feedback group; 
high outlier: control group), which were subsequently double-checked for incorrect data 
entry. However, in both cases no recording error is responsible for these outliers.  
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In a next step, quantitative diagnostic tools are used to assess normality. The results are 
shown in Table 13. The results are mixed. While the KS and JB test suggest that there is 
no reason to expect that the data be not from a normal distribution, the SW and AD test 
suggest the opposite.  
The research hypotheses 1a and 1b are tested based on the difference between the value 
estimates for valuation case one and two (in the following: DIFFVAL). As DIFFVAL for 
each subject is negative, it is multiplied by (-1). The DIFFVAL data are additionally 
analyzed to assess whether the normality assumption holds. As the two treatment groups 
and pre-posttest control group have two measures, only 30 data points exist. Table 11 
presents the descriptive statistics of DIFFVAL for each experimental group. 
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics (DIFFVAL) 
 Too low feedback Too high feedback No feedback 
Mean $92,141 $88,300 $85,783 
Median $86,600 $86,400 $86,750 
Standard deviation $23,259 $15,521 $19,114 
Minimum $70,713 $69,118 $55,322 
Maximum $142,447 $110,000 $120,000 
Range $71,734 $40,882 $64,678 
 
The moments of distribution for DIFFVAL are shown in Table 12. The third and fourth 
moments suggest that the distribution is not symmetric, i.e. has a positive skew, and has a 
steeper peak than the normal distribution.  
 
Table 12: Moments of Distribution (DIFFVAL) 
Mean $88,741 
Standard Deviation $19,055 
Skewness 0.877 
Kurtosis 1.007 
N 30 
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The histogram in Figure 3 visualizes the distribution with its longer right tail (right skew) 
and pointy peak. However, compared to the histogram of the estimates for the second 
valuation case (Figure 1), this distribution resembles the normal distribution to a higher 
degree. The Q-Q plots in Figure 4 suggest that the distribution of DIFFVAL estimates 
doesn’t follow the normal distribution perfectly. The four normality tests for the 
DIFFVAL data were conducted and the results are shown in Table 13. The tests 
unanimously suggest that no reason exists to expect the DIFFVAL data are not from a 
normal distribution. 
The results of the Levene’s test for equality of variance are shown in Table 13. The test 
compares the variance of each experimental group with the variance of the other three 
groups. None of the Levene’s test F-statistics is significant at the 5% level. Thus, the null 
hypothesis of equality of variances cannot be rejected.  
Table 13: Quantitative Diagnostic Tests 
 Diagnostic tool Test-statistic Conclusion 
Normality (Valuation case 2; N=40) 
 JB test 3.941 Fail to reject normality  
 KS test 1.298 Fail to reject normality 
 SW test 0.904* Reject normality 
 AD test 1.304* Reject normality 
Normality (DIFFVAL; N=30) 
 JB test 4 Fail to reject normality 
 KS test 0.801 Fail to reject normality 
 SW test 0.947 Fail to reject normality 
 AD test 0.562 Fail to reject normality 
Equality of variances (Levene’s test) 
 TPF too low & NF 0.00 Fail to reject equality of variances 
 TPF too high & NF 1.910 Fail to reject equality of variances 
 TPF too high & TPF too low 1.749 Fail to reject equality of variances 
 NF & VC 0.008 Fail to reject equality of variances 
 TPF too low & VC 0.006 Fail to reject equality of variances 
 TPF too high & VC 2.202 Fail to reject equality of variances 
Note: In the above table, (V2-V1) represents the difference between the value estimates for each 
case for each subject. The equality of variances (Levene’s test) is based on the value estimates for 
the second valuation case. In the table above, TPF too low is the “too low”feedback group, TPF too high 
is the “too high” feedback group, NF is the “no feedback” group and VC is the posttest-only 
validity control group. * denotes significance at the 5% level 
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In conclusion, the diagnostics show that the assumptions of parametric tests such as the 
independent samples t-test and one-way ANOVA are not violated by the experimental 
data. The estimate difference between the two valuation cases (DIFFVAL) is suggested 
to follow the normal distribution and the experimental groups have equal variances.  
4.3 Hypothesis testing results 
 
The individual group means for valuation case 1 do not differ significantly from each 
other. This suggests no pre-test differences between groups and no selection threats to 
internal validity. The following section presents the results of the hypotheses testing 
using the parametric independent samples t-test.  
H1a: Compared to a control group receiving no feedback, residential expert appraisers 
receiving the feedback that their previous value estimates were “too low” with regard to 
the realized transaction price don’t make higher subsequent value judgments on an 
unrelated property.  
This research hypothesis translates into the following testable hypotheses:  
H0: DIFFVALtoo low =DIFFVALNF   HA: DIFFVALtoo low ≠ DIFFVALNF   
Where DIFFVALNF and DIFFVALtoo low represent the mean difference between the value 
estimates of both valuation cases. As DIFFVAL is a negative number, it was multiplied 
by (-1). 
The mean is $92,141 for the “too low” treatment group and $85,783 for the “no 
feedback” control group. As shown in Table 14, the resulting t-statistic is 0.668, which is 
smaller than the critical t-statistic of ± 1.96 (α=0.05) for this two-tailed hypothesis. Thus, 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Subjects in the “too low” experimental treatment 
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group did not make higher subsequent value judgments than the “no feedback” control 
group. This finding is in line with the research hypothesis 1a. Using the value estimate for 
case 2, instead of DIFFVAL, yields the same result.  
The second research hypothesis is of main interest to this study: 
H1b: Compared to a control group receiving no feedback, residential expert appraisers 
receiving the feedback that their previous value estimates were “too high” with regard to 
the realized transaction price make lower subsequent value judgments on an unrelated 
property.  
This translates into the following testable hypotheses: 
H0: DIFFVALtoo high ≤DIFFVALNF   HA: DIFFVALtoo high >DIFFVALNF  
Where DIFFVALNF and DIFFVALtoo high represent the mean difference between the value 
estimates for both valuation cases.  
The mean is $88,300 for the “too high” treatment group and $85,783 for the control 
group. The t-statistic for this mean comparison is 0.323 (Table 14), which is below the 
critical t-statistic of 1.645 for this one-tailed hypothesis. The means of both groups are 
not significantly different and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. An analysis based 
on the V2 data yields the same result. Thus, no evidence is found that “too high” 
transaction price feedback introduces a downward bias into subsequent value estimates in 
a depressed market. However, at this point of the analysis, it cannot be determined 
whether these insignificant findings are the result of an absence of the hypothesized 
relationship or a failed manipulation or low statistical power. This will be further 
investigated in section 4.4. 
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Lastly, Table 14 presents the results of the testing bias analysis. To test for this bias, the 
following testable hypotheses were formulated: 
H0: VC=NF      HA: VC≠NF 
Where VC and NF are the mean value estimates for the second valuation case.  
A rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level would indicate a testing bias resulting 
from the pre-posttest design. The mean value estimate for the second valuation case is 
$69,009 for the “no feedback” control group and $75,393 for the validity control group. 
The t-statistic is -1.925, which is smaller than the critical statistic of ± 1.96. The null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, as the difference between observed and critical 
t-statistic is relatively small, a second test is run with the mean range for the second 
valuation case. For the second valuation case, appraisers were asked to give a range 
(highest and lowest value) around the point estimate that they are most comfortable with. 
The mean range difference for the pre-posttest “no feedback” control group is $27,228 
and for the posttest-only validity control group $23,522. The resulting t-statistic is 0.3, 
which is smaller than the critical t-statistic of ± 1.96 (failure to reject the null hypothesis). 
Consequently, these two mean range differences for valuation case 2 are not significantly 
different from each other. It can thus be concluded that no testing bias threatening 
internal and construct validity is present in the data.  
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Table 14: Result of Hypothesis Testing 
 RH 1a RH 1b Testing bias  
(point 
estimate) 
Testing 
bias 
(range) 
Parametric independent sample t-test 0.668 0.323 -1.925 0.30 
Table 15: Result of Hypothesis Testing (Robustness Checks) 
ANOVA 0.268 
Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U 
test 
45.00 45.00 29.00 40.5 
Note: The above tables present the t-statistics for the parametric t-test, the F-statistic for the one-
way ANOVA and the U-statistic for the non-parametric test. * denotes significance at the 5% 
level 
 
4.4 Robustness checks 
4.4.1.1 ANOVA 
 
The results of the one-way ANOVA are reported in Table 15. The F-statistic is 0.268 and 
thus insignificant at the 5% level. The null hypothesis that the means of the two treatment 
groups and the control group are equal cannot be rejected. The findings of the one-way 
ANOVA support the previous findings from the independent samples t-test. 
4.4.1.2 Non-parametric test 
 
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test is conducted as robustness check. The null-
hypothesis is that the medians of the respective experimental groups differ. The results of 
this test, based on the medians of DIFFVAL for the respective experimental groups, are 
shown in Table 15. All U-statistics are insignificant at the 5% level. The null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for either the research hypotheses or the testing bias hypothesis. The 
experimental treatment did not lead to differences between the “too high” feedback and 
“no feedback” control group. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test consequently 
supports the findings from the parametric t-test and one-way ANOVA.  
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4.4.1.3 Manipulation checks 
 
As discussed in section 3.3.2, manipulation checks were included into the study design. 
With regard to the previously identified insignificant results, these manipulation checks 
help to assess whether the insignificance is due to an absence of the hypothesized 
relationships or a non-reception of the treatment by subjects or low power.  
All subjects in the treatment groups were given the seller’s broker note with the 
transaction price feedback before they were provided with the second valuation case. The 
experimenter made sure that subjects still had access to their “per acre” and total value 
estimates from the first valuation case so they could compare them with the “per acre” 
transaction price in the feedback treatment, if needed. The argument that subjects in the 
treatment groups did not read (receive) the treatment can be rejected.  
The effect size for the independent samples t-test provides additional information about 
the hypothesized relationship. In this context, effect size can be defined as the magnitude 
of an effect or strength of a relationship between two variables. A non-existent 
relationship between two variables would imply an effect size of 0. Although effect sizes 
have to be interpreted in the context of a particular study and particular discipline, 
distinctions can be made between small effect (r=0.1), a medium effect (r=0.3) and a 
large effect (r=0.5). (Field, 2005) Based on equation 5, effect sizes for the data are 
calculated for both research hypotheses and reported in Table 16. These effect sizes 
represent statistics (based on a particular sample) and do not allow inferences about the 
effect sizes in the underlying population. Rather, they have to be understood as 
descriptive statistics and interpreted in combination with inferential statistics. The effect 
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sizes for both treatment groups are relatively small. The “too low” feedback treatment 
explains 16% of the total variance in DIFFVAL; the “too high” feedback treatment 
explains 8%. The “too low” feedback had a stronger effect on subsequent valuation 
estimates than the “too high” feedback, which differs from the expectation for a 
depressed housing market. Albeit small, this effect size analysis suggests that the 
manipulation has worked.  
Table 16: Effect Sizes 
 RH 1a RH1b 
Effect size (r) 0.16 0.08 
Note: The above effect sizes are based on the respective t-statistics and 18 degrees of freedom. (See 
equation 5) 
In the exit questionnaire, subjects were asked to rate the current market conditions in the 
metro Portland area. They could choose from the following options: “upward-trending” 
(1), “boom) (2), “downward-trending” (3), “bottom” (4) and “not sure” (5). Table 17 
presents the mean and median ratings per experimental group. Five subjects indicated 
“not sure”. Both statistics suggest that experimental subjects consider the housing market 
in the metro Portland area to be downward-trending or at the bottom. Subjects did not 
agree on whether the market is going down further or already hit bottom. However, both 
phases of the market cycle are characterized by pessimistic market sentiment and are 
likely to lead to a “depressed market” mindset in appraisers.  
A second manipulation check is used to investigate whether the provision of transaction 
price feedback increases the confidence of treatment group subjects compared to control 
group subjects. Table 17 shows the mean change in confidence between valuation case 1 
and 2 for all groups. While the treatment groups have higher mean changes in confidence, 
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these means do not differ significantly from the mean confidence change of the “no 
feedback” group. A number of appraisers commented on the confidence ratings in the 
exit questionnaire. They mentioned they are either highly confident, given all the 
information provided in the simplified cases, or are only moderately confident as they 
would have needed more detailed information to be more confident.  
In his dissertation, Hansz (1999) finds that the standard deviation for the second valuation 
case is lower for the treatment groups compared to the control group. If market feedback 
reduces uncertainty such a result would be expected. However, the standard deviation for 
the second valuation case is smaller for the control group compared to the treatment 
groups. (Table 17) Additionally, the valuation dispersion, measured as standard deviation 
divided by mean, for valuation case 1 is 11%, which is slightly larger than the 5 to 10% 
range identified in previous research (Hansz and Diaz, 2001). The valuation dispersion 
for valuation case 2 is 12.65% suggesting that the experimental manipulation has 
increased variability and potentially uncertainty. Valuation dispersion and standard 
deviations for case 2 may suggest that transaction price feedback did not reduce 
uncertainty, but rather increased it.  
 
Table 17: Manipulation Checks 
 Market 
conditions 
mean 
Market 
conditions 
median 
Change in 
confidence 
Standard 
deviation 
(V2) 
“Too low” feedback group 3.14 3 0.55 $8,075 
“Too high” feedback group 3.57 4 0.3 $12,775 
“No feedback” control group 3.60 4 0.2 $7,629 
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4.4.1.4 Power analysis  
 
Apart from a non-existing relationship or the non-reception of the treatment, low 
statistical power can be another reason for the insignificant findings of this study. The 
previous discussion of effect sizes and manipulation checks suggests subjects responded 
to the treatment, i.e. transaction price feedback has a small effect on subsequent value 
judgments. In the following, a power analysis is conducted to analyze whether low 
statistical power represents a threat to the statistical conclusion validity of this study. To 
calculate the post-hoc power, the following information is entered into the program 
G*Power: type of test (means: Difference between two independent means), one-or two-
tailed test hypothesis, effect size, sample size per group, Type I error (α). The effect size 
used in G*Power is based on Cohen’s d, which can be calculated in the program by 
providing the means and standard deviations of groups.  
The results in Table 18 show that low statistical power is a serious threat to conclusion 
validity. For the “too low” hypothesis, the probability of failing to reject a false null 
hypothesis (type II error=1-power) is 90%. For the “too high” hypothesis this probability 
is 91%. The power analysis suggests that the insignificant results may be caused by low 
statistical power, i.e. the inability to detect an effect that actually exists.  
Given the identified effect sizes, statistical power could be increased by increasing the 
sample size and/or increasing the type I error (α). The latter would have the largest effect 
on power, however, reducing this conclusion validity threat (low power) would result in 
an increase of another (type I error). Therefore, increasing the type I error probability is 
not justifiable. Increasing the sample size on the other hand is not feasible, considering 
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subject acquisition and data collection of 40 subjects took three months. Therefore, no 
immediate cure exists to the low power problem with regard to the employed statistical 
tests.  
The study in hand represents an extension of Hansz (1999) and Hansz and Diaz (2001). 
As a consequence, Table 18 compares power and effect sizes of Hansz (1999) to the 
current study. In Hansz (1999), the null hypothesis for the “too low” research hypothesis 
was rejected at the 5% level. The effect of the “too low” feedback is relatively large 
(r=0.44; Cohen’s d=0.92). The large effect size in combination with statistical 
significance suggests that the identified effect also exists in the underlying population. 
This effect size gives an indication of the effect size to be expected for a downward bias 
in a depressed market, if the effect also existed in the opposite direction. However, the 
effect size for the “too high” feedback in this study is only 0.08, which is relatively 
similar to the effect sizes of the Hansz’ (1999) “too high” feedback group and the “too 
low” feedback group in this study. For these two groups, no effect of transaction price 
feedback on value judgments was expected. Thus, the small effect size for the “too high” 
group could be an indication for a non-existing hypothesized relationship.  
 
Table 18: Results Power Analysis 
 Residential Appraisers (2011) Commercial Appraisers (1999)* 
 T-
statistic 
Effect size Power T-
statistic 
Effect size Power 
“Too low” 
Hypothesis 
0.668 0.16 (Cohen’s 
d: 0.3) 
0.1 2.067* 0.44 (Cohen’s 
d: 0.92) 
0.63 
“Too high” 
Hypothesis 
0.323 0.08 (Cohen’s 
d: 0.14) 
0.09 -0.782 0.18 (Cohen’s 
d: 0.35) 
0.19 
* Based on Hansz (1999); * denotes significance at the 5% level 
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
The following chapter concludes this dissertation. The first section discusses the findings 
while the second section provides an outlook for future research.  
5.1 Discussion 
In an upward-trending real estate market, transaction price feedback has been found to 
introduce an upward bias into subsequent valuation judgments. (Hansz and Diaz, 2001) 
The identified asymmetric bias represents a deviation from the normative expectation that 
market feedback influences valuation judgments symmetrically. This dissertation revisits 
the findings of Hansz and Diaz (2001) and extends their study to residential appraisers in 
a depressed real estate market.  
If the upward bias identified by Hansz and Diaz (2001) is the result of rising real estate 
market conditions, I expect a downward bias in depressed market conditions. In 
particular, I hypothesize that residential appraisers provided with the feedback that their 
previous value estimate was too high compared to the realized sales price for this 
property will make a significantly lower value judgments for a subsequent unrelated 
property than appraisers without this market feedback. On the other hand, I expect 
appraisers in the “too low” feedback group to not make higher (or lower) value 
judgments than the “no feedback” control group.   
I use a pre-posttest experimental design with one factor (market feedback) fixed at three 
levels (“too low”, “too high” and “no feedback) to test my hypotheses. In experiments 
conducted with 40 active Oregon State certified residential appraisers in the Portland 
MSA from October to December 2011, I find no evidence that “too high” transaction 
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price feedback has an effect on value judgments. Parametric tests (t-test, ANOVA) and 
non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney U test) yield insignificant results. While no 
difference was expected for the “too low” feedback and the “no feedback” control group, 
the results for the “too high” feedback group suggest that market feedback doesn’t 
introduce a downward bias into appraisal judgments in a depressed market. Thus, 
residential appraisers in this study behave as normatively expected.  
The insignificant results could be explained in a number of ways: Firstly, experimental 
subjects may not have read or noticed the treatment. While the experimenter ensured that 
all subjects read the seller’s broker note before proceeding to the second valuation case, 
residential appraisers may not commonly receive feedback on transactions from brokers 
and thus may not have responded as strongly as they would have to other providers of 
feedback (e.g. AMCs, sales information on MLS). 
Secondly, low statistical power represents a threat to conclusion validity and could be 
responsible for the insignificant results. A power analysis confirms the presence of this 
threat. The analysis revealed that the magnitude of the effect of transaction price 
feedback on value judgments in the dataset is small. However, low statistical power does 
not allow any conclusions about the existence of this effect in the underlying population. 
A larger sample size would be needed to increase statistical power.  
Thirdly, the insignificant findings could be the result of an absence of the hypothesized 
relationship. One of the explanations Hansz and Diaz (2001) provide for their findings is 
client pressure. In an upward-trending or booming real estate market, clients such as 
lenders or home sellers are more likely to prefer valuation judgments at the upper end of 
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the justifiable range. Appraisers, anticipating property values to rise further, responded to 
this client feedback. Thus, they were more likely to (subconsciously) respond to the “too 
low” feedback in the experiment. This explanation is in line with the findings of previous 
client feedback studies, which were conducted in rising real estate markets: Hansz 
(2004a) finds that client feedback biases commercial appraisers upwardly while Diaz and 
Hansz (2010) find the same effect for residential appraisers.  
However, client-appraiser relationships have changed significantly as a result of the most 
recent housing crisis. The previously most important client group, mortgage lenders, has 
been disconnected from residential appraisers. Nowadays, AMCs are predominantly used 
to get appraisals for lending purposes. (See section 2.2) When asked whether AMCs 
pressure residential appraisers to deliver a certain value (e.g. a low value estimate in a 
down-market), experimental subjects in this study had different experiences. Some 
appraisers confirmed that, compared to the previous situation in the rising market, AMCs 
do not put appraisers under pressure to validate a certain amount (e.g. pending mortgage 
amount). Other appraisers argued AMCs indirectly pressure appraisers to arrive at a 
certain amount as they have a large number of appraisers available in their pool and could 
easily replace an appraiser for another one that delivers more “suitable” value judgments. 
However, the overall consent was that AMCs do not pressure residential appraisers to 
arrive at a certain value estimate. The pressure residential appraisers experience currently 
is not regarding the amount of the final value estimate. Rather, residential appraisers find 
themselves pressured by AMCs to charge the lowest fee, have the shortest turnover time 
and prepare appraisal reports in the manner required by AMCs. In conclusion, the 
changes to the residential appraisal task environment have resulted in an elimination of 
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client pressure on value estimates. Contrary to the commercial appraisers in Hansz and 
Diaz (2001) and the “too low” feedback, residential appraisers in this study do not 
directly receive “too high” feedback from their clients. Thus, their subconscious reaction 
to this feedback in the experiment may have been relatively weak resulting in a 
substantively negligible effect, which suggests a non-existing relationship.  
Hansz and Diaz (2001) present optimism and a conservatism bias as additional 
explanations for their findings. However, the manipulation check revealed that residential 
appraisers in this study considered the current housing market in the Portland MSA 
downward-trending or bottoming. Thus, subjects were sufficiently pessimistic. 
Additionally, the depressed housing market is also likely to make residential appraisers 
conservative in their appraisals. Anecdotal evidence from subjects supports this 
conservatism bias explanation. Receiving transaction price feedback may only reduce this 
bias slightly, if at all. In conclusion, the elimination of direct client feedback to 
residential appraisers is a likely explanation for an absence of the hypothesized 
relationship. This in turn may be the primary explanation for the insignificant findings. 
However, as client-agent-effects are not explicitly tested in this study and statistical 
power is low, no final conclusion can be drawn. 
5.2 Future research  
Hansz and Diaz (2001) and this study focus on simple outcome feedback. However, 
appraisers receive feedback in a number of other ways. These more complex alternative 
feedback types (e.g. task properties feedback) represent starting points for future 
research. One source of feedback to appraisers are brokers. Particularly over the last 
years clients such as lenders have moved towards requiring appraisers to consult with 
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brokers and/or are using a separate broker’s price opinion (BPO) in addition to an 
appraisal. As brokers are involved in current market transactions, they have an 
informational advantage to appraisers who rely on past transaction information. This 
advantage is particularly strong in a depressed market characterized by short-sales and 
infrequent sales. BPO can be considered task properties feedback providing appraisers 
with information about market trends (e.g. sales prices). Future research could investigate 
whether task properties feedback in form of BPOs biases appraisers, whether it changes 
the weights appraisers place on different information and whether appraisers anchor on 
BPOs.  
Legislation such as the HVCC has changed the residential appraisal industry 
significantly. While residential appraisers used to build and maintain relationships with 
individual lenders in certain geographical markets, they are now pooled with a large 
number of other appraisers and then assigned by the AMC to an appraisal assignment 
from a lender. In some cases, appraisers have to bid for assignments in which the 
appraiser offering the lowest fee receives the assignment. As AMCs pool residential 
appraisers and assign them, appraisers with familiarity in a certain metropolitan 
submarket may be given assignments in markets they are less familiar with. Residential 
appraisers in Portland even reported that appraisers from Seattle, WA or Salem, OR come 
to Portland to value residential properties, even though they may not have any local 
market experience or access to the respective MLS and thus suitable comps. 
Geographically unfamiliar appraisers are particularly problematic as the Portland MSA is 
characterized by a multitude of very different neighborhoods and submarkets. With 
regard to previous studies of anchoring and geographical unfamiliarity (see section 2.1.2), 
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this represents a starting point into future research on whether out-of-town appraisers are 
more prone to heuristic biases and market feedback-induced biases. Alternatively, 
heuristic biases could be investigated by comparing the behavior of out-of-town 
appraisers to their behavior in their home market. Finally, the increased pressure of 
AMCs on residential appraisers to conduct a valuation in a relatively short amount of 
time (e.g. 24 or 48 hours) may increase the tendency of appraisers to rely on heuristics. 
Additional research into heuristic biases in real estate appraisals could investigate this 
issue.   
Databases such as COSTAR or MLS represent rich sources of information to appraisers, 
which make the data collection faster and more economical. Future anchoring or 
feedback studies could, following Tidwell (2011), investigate whether these databases 
debias or bias appraisers more strongly, especially with regard to out-of-town appraisers 
who are provided with access to databases with information about a market they are 
unfamiliar with. Other studies could investigate whether this wealth of information has 
changed how appraisers select and weight information to be used to make an appraisal 
judgment.  
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FIGURES  
Figure 1: Histogram Valuation Case 2 (Full Sample) 
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Figure 2: Q-Q Plots Valuation Case 2 (Full Sample) 
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Figure 3: Histogram (DIFFVAL) 
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Figure 4: Q-Q Plots (DIFFVAL) 
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APPENDIX A: VALUATION CASE 1 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
You have been engaged to estimate the market value of the fee simple interest in a 0.42 
acres vacant residential tract of land in Sandy Springs, Georgia. The date of the appraisal 
is the most recent date of inspection, October 15, 2011. 
 
Enclosed you will find data and information, which resulted from a diligent search of the 
market. Please use the attached work sheet to conduct an analysis of the market value of 
the subject property. After completing your analysis, enter your value estimate in the 
provided space provided below.  
 
VALUE JUDGMENT 
 
Value estimate 
 
Per acre value estimate    $      
Times 0.42 acres      x 0.42 
Equals a total value estimate of    $      
Rounded to (if necessary)    $      
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WORK SHEET 
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IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
 
Location:     239 Devonwood Drive 
      Sandy Springs, GA 30328 
Tax Identification Number:    17 -0086-0004-022-1 
County, State:     Fulton County, Georgia 
Size:      0.42 acres 
Zoning:      R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1  
family) 
 
 
PURPOSE OF THE APPRAISAL 
 
The purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the market value of the fee simple interest of 
the above-identified property, as of October 15, 2011, the most recent date of inspection.  
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MACRO LOCATION DATA 
The city of Sandy Springs is a northern suburb of Atlanta and located in northwest 
Georgia. It is located in North-Fulton County, with Roswell to the North (8 miles), 
Dunwoody to the East (3.5 miles), Marietta to the West (14 miles) and Atlanta to the 
South (16 miles). With a 2010 population of approximately 94,000 it represents the sixth 
largest city in the state and the second largest city in the metro Atlanta area.  
The primary north/south highways are I-75, I-85 and I-400. Sandy Springs lies outside 
the I-285 Perimeter. The east/west highway I-20 can be reached via the I-285. These 
highways connect Sandy Springs to other parts of the metro Atlanta area as well as other 
cities in Georgia (e.g. Augusta, Athens, Savannah) and the Southeast (e.g. Nashville, TN 
and Gainesville, FL). Sandy Springs is served by the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit 
Authority (MARTA) and connected to the metro Atlanta area by a number of bus routes 
and two rail stations (Sandy Springs and North Springs). Both stations offer secure 
parking for commuters and connections to the major employment, retail and 
entertainment areas in Buckhead, Midtown and Downtown. From the North Springs 
station, downtown can be reached within 30 minutes and the airport within 45 minutes. 
Slow but consistent economic growth has characterized the subject area and is expected 
to continue to do so. A strong employment base is present. The proximity of Sandy 
Springs to major highways and MARTA ensures good access to all population and 
employment centers in the metro Atlanta area. In 2009, the median household income for 
Sandy Springs was estimated to be $106,240, which is above the Georgia median income 
of $47,469. 
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NEIGHBORHOOD AND PROPERTY DATA 
The subject property is located in a neighborhood delineated by the following major 
roads: Brandon Mills Road (west), Roswell Road (east), Dalrymple Road (north) and 
Abernathy Road (south). The neighborhood consists of single-family homes. Major retail 
facilities along Roswell Road and shopping centers at the intersections of Roswell Road 
and Abernathy Road, Johnson Ferry Road as well as Hammond Drive can be reached 
within 5 to 15 minutes driving time. Major retailers located within close proximity of the 
subject property are Publix, Whole Foods, Trader Joes and Kroger (grocery stores), 
Lowe’s (Home Improvement) and Ross (clothing). A variety of smaller retailers, 
restaurants and services (e.g. medical, dry cleaning) are also located along Roswell Road. 
The neighborhood is very family friendly with eight schools and pre-schools within a 15 
minute driving radius. These schools include the Spalding Drive Elementary School, the 
Jewish Weber High School, the North Springs High School, the Christian Mount Vernon 
Presbyterian School as well as special needs schools and daycare facilities. Georgia State 
University, Emory University, Georgia Institute of Technology and Kennesaw State 
University can be reached by public transport or car with 30 to 45 minutes. Sandy 
Springs is close to major hospitals, rehabilitation, senior housing and other medical 
facilities such as the Northside Hospital and Children’s Healthcare of Atlanta. 
The subject property can be accessed from Roswell Road via Abernathy Road/Brandon 
Mill Road or Dalrymple Road. The neighborhood is approximately 80% built-up. Good 
levels of maintenance and physical appearance typify the general neighborhood. No 
adverse neighborhood conditions are noted. The subject property is almost rectangularly 
shaped and has road frontage of 134.25 feet. Devonwood Drive is paved with concrete 
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and curbing and storm sewers are present. Topographically, the property steeply slopes 
downward in the back. The site is served with natural gas, public water and sewer, 
electricity, and telephone service. Site ingress and egress are typical for the area. 
Presently there are no easements, encroachments or hazardous materials, which encumber 
the site. The subject is not located in a flood hazard zone. Police and fire protection is 
provided to the subject. Based on the site’s size, shape, topography, accessibility and 
frontage, the site is considered to possess good overall physical for residential 
development, prevalent in the neighborhood.  
The property is under the jurisdiction of Fulton County and is currently zoned R3 (101). 
This classification permits single-family use.   
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MAP 1: SANDY SPRINGS AND METRO ATLANTA  
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MAP 2: SANDY SPRINGS 
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MAP 3: SUBJECT PROPERTY NEIGHBORHOOD 
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MAP 4: PLAT 
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COMPARABLE SALES 
LAND SALE 1 
 
 
Location:    314 Spalding Drive 
Sale Price:    $277,280 
Financing:    Cash to seller, typical terms considered cash equivalent 
Date of Sale:   12/30/2010 
Size:     0.93 acres 
Price/Unit:   $298,150/acre 
Zoning:   R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1 family) 
Remarks:  Currently vacant and cleared; site has good access, minimal 
site preparation required, all utilities available.   
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LAND SALE 2 
 
 
Location:  39 Dartmoor Circle 
Sale Price:  $159,705 
Financing:  Cash to seller, typical terms considered cash equivalent 
Date of Sale: 02/17/2011 
Size: 0.39 acres 
Price/Unit: $409,500/acre 
Zoning: R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1 family) 
Remarks: Shortly after the above picture was taken, the construction 
on a single-family house started on the site; property has 
good access; typical site preparation required, all utilities 
available.  
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LAND SALE 3 
 
 
Location: 256 Devonwood Drive 
Sale Price: $223,892 
Financing: Cash to seller, typical terms considered cash equivalent 
Date of Sale: 07/06/2011 
Size: 0.58 acres 
Price/Unit: $386,020/acre 
Zoning: R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1 family) 
Remarks: Subsequent to sale, site was improved with a single-family 
house; site has good access and requires minimum site 
preparation, all utilities available.   
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LAND SALE 4 
 
 
Location:  247 Devonwood Drive 
Sale Price: $293,345 
Financing: Cash to seller, typical terms considered cash equivalent 
Date of Sale: 09/05/2011 
Size: 0.65 acres 
Price/Unit: $451,300/acre 
Zoning: R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1 family) 
Remarks: Vacant, minimal site preparation required, good access, all 
utilities available.   
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LAND SALE 5 
 
 
Location:    235 Devonwood Drive 
Sale Price:   $149,174 
Financing:    Cash to seller, typical terms considered cash equivalent 
Date of Sale:   10/01/2011 
Size:    0.48 acres 
Price/Unit:   $310,780/acre 
Zoning:   R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1 family) 
Remarks:    Site is generally level and cleared and enjoys good access,  
all utilities available.  
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MAP 5: SUBJECT PROPERTY AND COMPS 
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APPENDIX B: VALUATION CASE 2 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
You have been engaged to estimate the market value of the fee simple interest in a 0.2 
acres vacant residential tract of land located in Newnan, Georgia. The date of the 
appraisal is the most recent date of inspection, October 15, 2011. 
 
Enclosed you will find data and information, which resulted from a diligent search of the 
market. Please use the attached work sheet to conduct an analysis of the market value of 
the subject property. After completing your analysis, enter your value estimate in the 
provided space below. 
 
VALUE ESTIMATE 
Per acre value estimate    $      
Times 0.2 acres      x 0.2 
Equals a total value estimate of    $      
Rounded to (if necessary)    $      
 
Range   
Lowest value $    to Highest value $      
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WORK SHEET  
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IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT 
 
Location:      45 Fourth Street 
      Newnan, GA 30263 
Tax Identification Number:    N27-0001-022  
County, State:     Coweta County, Georgia 
Size:      0.2 acres  
Zoning:      R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1  
family) 
 
PURPOSE OF THE APPRAISAL 
 
The purpose of this appraisal is to estimate the market value of the fee simple interest of 
the above-identified property, as of October 15, 2011, the most recent date of inspection.  
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MACRO LOCATION DATA 
The city of Newnan is located in and the seat of Coweta County, with Atlanta to the 
North (30 miles), Peachtree City to the East (13 miles) as well as Columbus (72 miles) 
and Auburn, Alabama (73 miles) to the South. It has a population of approximately 
33,000, which grew by 103.4% over the last decade. While the county’s population 
growth has been slowing down since 2000, the city of Newnan continues to grow 
substantially.  
The primary north/south highway is I-85, which connects Newnan with Atlanta to the 
North and Columbus and Auburn, AL to the South. Coweta Transit provides public 
transportation services (buses) within the county. Buses operated by the Georgia 
Regional Transportation Authority (GRTA) offer commuters an alternative to individual 
transportation by connecting Newnan with downtown Atlanta. Newnan is approximately 
25 miles south of the Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport and home to the 
Newnan-Coweta airport, which is predominantly used for military and corporate aviation. 
Stable economic growth has characterized the subject area, which is expected to continue. 
In 2009, the median household income in Coweta County was $59,848, which is above 
the Georgia median income of $47,469. 
The subject property is located in a neighborhood delineated by Lagrange Street to the 
South, Jackson Street to the East, Belk Road to the West and Clark Street to the North. It 
is in walking distance (15 minutes) and short driving distance (less than 5 minutes) from 
Newnan’s historic city center, which offers a number of restaurants, shops, cafés, county 
administrative offices and houses of worship. Entertainment and retail facilities with 
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major retailers such as Kroger are located along Bullsboro Drive, which connects the 
historic city center with the I-85 highway. Ashley Park Shopping Center on Bullsboro 
Drive offers a variety of major retailers such as Best Buy (electronics), Barnes&Noble 
(books), Belk and Dillard’s (department stores), DSW and American Eagle (clothing) as 
well as Regal Cinemas. These retail facilities can be reached from the subject property 
within 15 minutes. The neighborhood is very family friendly with nine schools and pre-
schools within a driving distance of 15 minutes. These educational facilities include the 
Newnan High School, Atkinson Elementary School, Evans Middle School, Carolyn 
Barron Montessori School and a number of pre-schools. The subject property is close to 
the Piedmont Newnan Hospital.  
 
NEIGHBORHOOD AND PROPERTY DATA 
The subject property can be accessed from Lagrange Street to the South and East, Spring 
Street to the North and Boone Drive to the West. The neighborhood is approximately 
85% built up and consists of single-family houses. Good levels of maintenance and 
physical appearance typify the general neighborhood. Lot sizes range from 0.22 acres to 
1.65 acres, with the typical lot size of 0.5 to 1 acres. Utilities include underground gas, 
electricity, and fiber-optic cable. The development is served with public water and sewer 
systems. Roads are concrete with curbs and storm sewers. No adverse neighborhood 
conditions are noted.  
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The subject property is rectangularly shaped and has road frontage of 70 feet. Curbing 
and storm sewers are present and topographically, the property is evenly sloped (flat). 
The site is served with natural gas, public water and sewer, electricity, and telephone 
service. Site ingress and egress are typical for the area. Presently there are no easements, 
encroachments or hazardous materials, which encumber the site. The subject is not 
located in a flood hazard zone. Police and fire protection is provided to the subject. Based 
on the site’s size, shape, topography, accessibility and frontage, the site is considered to 
possess good overall physical conditions for residential development, prevalent in the 
neighborhood.  
The property is under the jurisdiction of Coweta County and is currently zoned R3 (101). 
This classification permits single-family use.   
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MAP 1: NEWNAN AND METRO ATLANTA 
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MAP 2: NEWNAN 
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MAP 3: SUBJECT PROPERTY NEIGHBORHOOD 
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MAP 4: PLAT 
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COMPARABLE SALES 
LAND SALE 1 
 
 
Location:    36 Waverly Circle 
Sale Price:   $186,606 
Financing:    Cash to seller, typical terms considered cash equivalent 
Date of Sale:   02/01/2011  
Size:     0.63 acres 
Price/Unit:   $296,200/acre 
Zoning:    R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1 family) 
Remarks: Currently vacant and for sale; site is level and enjoys good 
access, all utilities available.  
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LAND SALE 2 
 
 
Location:    58 Fourth Street 
Sale Price:   $82,140 
Financing:    Cash to seller, typical terms considered cash equivalent 
Date of Sale:   08/18/2011 
Size:     0.2 acres 
Price/Unit:   $410,700/acre 
Zoning:     R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1 family) 
Remarks: Subsequent to sale, site was improved with a single family 
home; site has good access and required minimum site 
preparation, all utilities available 
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LAND SALE 3 
 
 
Location:    37 Fourth Street 
Sale Price:   $58,690 
Financing:    Cash to seller, typical terms considered cash equivalent 
Date of Sale:   09/10/2011 
Size:     0.26 acres 
Price/Unit:   $225,731/acre 
Zoning:    R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1 family) 
Remarks: Single family home is currently under construction on the 
site; property has good access; typical site preparation 
required, all utilities available.  
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LAND SALE 4 
 
 
Location:    26 Fourth Street 
Sale Price:   $135,957 
Financing:    Cash to seller, typical terms considered cash equivalent 
Date of Sale:   03/07/2011 
Size:     0.37 acres 
Price/Unit:   $367,450/acre 
Zoning:    R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1 family) 
Remarks: Vacant and cleared, minimal site preparation required, 
good access, all utilities available.  
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LAND SALE 5 
 
 
Location:    42 Fourth Street 
Sale Price:   $57,657 
Financing:    Cash to seller, typical terms considered cash equivalent 
Date of Sale:   07/30/2011 
Size:     0.18 acres 
Price/Unit:   $320,316/acre 
Zoning:    R3 (Land use code: 101 - Residential 1 family) 
Remarks: Currently vacant and leveled; site has good access, minimal 
site preparation required, all utilities available.   
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MAP 5: SUBJECT PROPERTY AND COMPS 
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APPENDIX C: EXIT QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1. What is your gender?   Female  Male 
2. What is your age?   Years 
3. Are you currently working as residential appraiser?  Yes  No 
4. How many years of experience in residential appraisal do you have?          Years 
5. What is your highest level of formal education?  
High School Some College   Bachelor’s Degree Graduate Degree 
6. What percentage of your work is in residential real estate valuation? 
Residential:  %  Other:    % 
7. List any appraisal certifications and/or designations you presently hold: 
 
8. How confident do you feel about your estimates in the two valuations? Please 
circle a number.  
 
Case 1 (Sandy Springs):   
Not at all confident       Very confident 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 
Case 2 (Newnan):  
Not at all confident       Very confident 
 1  2  3  4  5 
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9. What percentage of your appraisal work comes from the following sources? 
Mortgage lenders:      % 
Individual homebuyers/sellers:    % 
Appraisal management company:    % 
Governmental agencies:     % 
Other:        % 
If other, please provide more information about the source:  
 
10. Overall, in what phase of the market cycle do you think the housing market in 
the metro Portland area is currently in? Please circle your answer. 
 
 (1) “upward-trending”  (2) “boom”  (3) “downward-trending”  (4) “bottom” 
 
(5) “not sure” 
 
11. Have you had any recent appraisal assignments in the metro Atlanta area? 
No     Yes (explain) 
 
 
 
 
 
